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AMERICA'S PLACE
IN THE WORLD

BOOKS BY
HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

THE FOUNDATION OF THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE

THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE

THE NEW MAP OF AFRICA

THE NEW MAP OF ASIA

THE BLACKEST PAGE IN MODERN
HISTORY

THE RECONSTRUCTION OF POLAND
AND THE NEAR EAST

AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD POLI-
TICS

EUROPE SINCE 1918

AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

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PORTS OF FRANCE

AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

BY

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS

Author of "THE NEW MAP OF EUROPE," "EUROPE SINCE 1918,"
"AN INTRODUCTION TO WORLD POLITICS," etc.



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To
ARTHUR E. BESTOR

President of Chautauqua Institution
and to the thousands of thoughtful Americans
who studied these world problems with me at Lake
Chautauqua. We frequently disagreed as to the
means but never as to the goal.

FOREWORD

Long before the World War it took a big event to concentrate American attention upon any European problem. Even then the interest was short-lived; there was no demand for continuity of information concerning the particular question that had held the head-lines at the moment of the great happening.

Did the World War bring about a change in the attitude of the American mind toward Europe? Have we become more interested in European questions? No. Those who have long been engaged year in and year out in writing from Europe for the American press are able to see little, if any change. We are called upon to supply news. A problem that has not immediate news value does not make the front page; in most newspapers mention of the problem is omitted except when it is in an acute or sensational stage.

Are we still insular? Are we narrow-minded? Are we selfish? Are we uneducated? Have we no vision?

Affirmative answers to the five suggestions do not

furnish a satisfactory explanation of the general unconsciousness of the New World to what is happening in the Old World. In reality we are not as insular, as narrow-minded, as selfish, as uneducated, as lacking in vision, as are most European peoples, and yet they are far more interested in their neighbors' political, economic, and social well-being than we are.

The causes are patent. Until recently the peoples of America have not had to worry over what was happening to the peoples of Europe or over what the peoples of Europe were doing in other parts of the world. Europeans, on the other hand, have long understood the significance and importance of events, of tendencies, and of the development of activities in countries other than their own; they have realized that they must watch and study one another because their own security and prosperity depended upon the internal and international policies of other nations. The destinies of European peoples have been and are still being vitally affected by the overseas expansion and by the relations with one another of their own and other nations.

Now the time has come when America's place in the world must be a matter of thoughtful and sustained consideration to all Americans. We have been saturated with propaganda on behalf of particular European nations and with propaganda for

the advancement of various panaceas. Violent partizanships have sprung up. Prejudices and antagonisms have been created. The truth about our own past, about Europe's needs, and about our national interests has been distorted. Dreamers, idealists, enthusiasts, champions of particular European nations, quacks, and agents of foreign-directed propaganda movements abound among us. What are we to believe?

Up to the present time as a nation we believe nothing, and scolding and importunity have tended to discredit the mildest and most reasonable proposals for international coöperation, such as the participation of the United States in the World Court.

All organizations working to educate our people in international affairs, irrespective of the particular form of American participation in world politics they advocate, do some real good. They awaken interest in problems that confront us. But none of these organizations will make serious headway with the American people until there is a willingness and a purpose to approach the problem of America's place in the world from the point of view of American interests.

Last year, when I was writing "Europe since 1918," I planned to devote chapters in that book to the League of Nations and to America's rela-

tions with Europe. But when I got into the story I realized that the New World had played only an accidental rôle in European affairs during the World War, a negligible rôle during the peace negotiations, and no rôle at all since the Treaty of Versailles was signed.

The working out of European policies during the war and since has been inexorably logical, and it was demonstrated at the Paris Peace Conference that American influence, even when the memory of our intervention was vivid, could not be expected to change or modify radically the foreign policy of European nations.

It was a natural conclusion that a discussion of America's relations with Europe had no part in a book on Europe since 1918—a natural conclusion because it was a fact. Hence the treatment in a separate volume of America's place in the world.

HERBERT ADAMS GIBBONS.

Princeton, April, 1924.

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AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

Men are very apt to run into extremes. Hatred of England may carry some into an excess of confidence in France, especially when motives of gratitude are thrown into the scale. . . . It is a maxim, founded on universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its own interests; and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it.

George Washington to Continental Congress, 1778.

AMERICA'S PLACE IN THE WORLD

CHAPTER I

THE EUROPEAN BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN COUNTRIES

THE countries of North and South America were founded by Europeans; and they have been nurtured and developed by an uninterrupted influx of new blood from Europe. The native elements were wholly dispossessed by the white man in the greater part of North America. In other parts of the New World mingling of blood did not mean the fusion of the civilization of the European invaders with that of the aboriginal inhabitants. Asia played no part in the settlement and development of North and South America. Africans came in large number, but not of their own initiative; and they have remained an inferior and unassimilated element, denied the opportunity of coöperating on terms of equality with Europeans.

The Europeans brought with them to the New

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World their culture, religion, institutions, and customs. Even in countries like Mexico and Peru, which enjoyed highly developed civilizations, the Europeans borrowed nothing from the peoples they dispossessed. Both in North and South America they destroyed or ignored humankind. What they brought with them or were later able to obtain from Europe sufficed for all their needs. From the fifteenth century up to the twentieth century there was a constant call upon Europe for man-power and money; and European political and social evolution vitally influenced the life of the New World.

This is the underlying and outstanding fact of American history. In Asia there are hundreds of millions who owe nothing to Europe, who are impervious to European claims of superior civilization, and whom Europe can hope to dominate only by force. In Africa Europe is confronted with deserts and jungles and climatic conditions that render a large portion of the continent inhospitable and an unfruitful field for Caucasian settlement. But in America Europe is at home; for America is Europe transplanted, and Europeans and Americans are not aliens to one another as they both are to Asiatics and Africans.

If the United States and other American countries had simply been settled by colonists from Europe, who had been left to work out their own salvation

and who had developed a civilization of their own, it might not be necessary to emphasize the dependence of America upon Europe in the past and the interdependence of America and Europe in the present and the future. But that has not been the case. Although we are separated from Europe by a great ocean, we are really nearer to Europe than countries like Morocco and Asia Minor, which are within sight of Europe. This same fact holds good of Australia and New Zealand and probably of South Africa. Countries inhabited and controlled by peoples of Caucasian stock, countries constantly fed by European immigration and developed by European capital, cannot consider themselves as in any way separated from or independent of Europe.

In discussing America's place in the world, therefore, we must begin by considering our European background.

Taken as a whole, Americans are of European blood. Even the non-European elements, descendants of aborigines and Africans, speak European languages and profess European religions. The few exceptions prove the rule; and the Asiatics in America, numbering considerably less than 1 per cent of the population, are regarded as aliens. Nowhere on the American continent is there a distinctive Asiatic settlement; and there is no new blood coming from Africa. The countries of

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America are all distinctively Christian; and there is a close connection between most of the religious bodies in America and the mother churches in Europe. The four languages spoken in America that are officially recognized by the various countries, English, French, Spanish, and Portuguese, have not, in their written form at least, changed. New World writers endeavor to retain and to be governed by the standards of usage of the European countries whose tongues were transplanted here. As for contacts, it is estimated that only one out of a thousand of all who leave America for residence or travel abroad goes primarily to any other continent than Europe.

From the very beginning of European colonization in the New World the financial and economic connection between Europe and America has been unbroken. Until recently Europe could have lived independently of America. But at no time has European capital been a less vital factor than European emigration in building up the New World. Without the one the development of America would have been arrested as promptly and as wholly as without the other. Up to the twentieth century the major portion of the money invested in South and Central American, Mexican, and Canadian securities came from Europe. During the first hundred years of statehood virtually every great enterprise

in the United States was dependent upon London, Paris, and Amsterdam for funds for expansion. This was particularly true of railways and public utilities. Shifting of investments during and subsequent to the World War diminished European ownership of American securities. But even with all the liquidation that has been going on since 1914 it is believed by some experts that European holdings in the New World remain considerably greater than all that Europe owes, publicly and privately, in America. This is eloquent testimony to the part played by European capital in the development of the New World.

When we consider our background, we must realize that while American countries may be said to have interests in common, interests that are in many cases in conflict with European interests, it is not to be ignored that American countries severally have powerful ties binding them to certain European countries and to Europe as a whole, ties of blood, language, culture, institutions, traditions, religion, and business connections. The last-named tie is particularly intimate because it involves not only huge sums of invested money but also markets for European manufactured articles and sources of supply for European consumers of food-stuffs and raw materials. These ties have arisen from America's European background, and they have

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been strengthened and made indissoluble by the never-ending need of New World countries (except the United States) for fresh European blood and capital and of European buyers for what the New World produces.

Great Britain, France, Holland, and Denmark exercise political control over portions of the American continent and adjacent islands; Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, and France enjoy the prestige and advantages that come from having their language spoken in America; while virtually all European countries are represented in the composite population of America, and particularly Great Britain, Ireland, Germany, and Italy. Tens of thousands of Americans send regularly sums of money to relatives in Europe; hundreds of thousands are saving and hoping for the day when they can return to Europe to settle down for their old age; and millions who have retained no connection with Europe other than sentimental and traditional ties are using their influence and their money to help the country from which they or their ancestors came. This is true notably of the Irish, German, Polish, and Greek elements; although it may be said that almost all the nationalist movements in Europe have been powerfully encouraged, if not wholly supported and engineered, from America.

It is impossible to assume, therefore, that the

peoples of America are indifferent or only lukewarm in their interest in the fortunes of the people of Europe. Brazil has great interest in Portugal; Argentina, Chile, and other countries still look upon Spain as the mother-country; the Canadians and inhabitants of some West-Indian islands are loyal Britons; while there is not a country in Europe that does not have its friends among citizens of the United States.

CHAPTER II

THE TITLES LOST BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN THE NEW WORLD SINCE JULY 4, 1776

THE Declaration of Independence was a turning-point in the history of the New World; for it was the beginning of the breaking away of European colonists from the countries under whose auspices the settlement of America had been undertaken. Independent nationhood in the New World began with the rebellion of British colonies. Previous to July 4, 1776, Holland, Spain, and France had lost title to some of their American possessions through unsuccessful wars with Great Britain. By the Napoleonic Wars Great Britain further increased her American possessions at the expense of Holland and Spain. But the representatives of the thirteen British colonies created a precedent that had as its result the birth of twenty other countries and the virtual independence of Canada.

When the inhabitants of the Atlantic seaboard, from New Hampshire to Georgia, rebelled against the authority of Great Britain, the greater portion

of the vast territory to the north of Maine (then part of Massachusetts) had been under British rule only fifteen years, and was inhabited mostly by French-speaking Catholics. The Canadians were able to drive a hard and shrewd bargain with their new masters for the preservation of local liberties; so it was natural that they did not care to throw in their lot with the English-speaking rebels, almost all of whom were Protestant. They feared to lose nationality, language, and religion. Had the Canadians been largely British, Canada would probably have been drawn into the movement launched at Boston and consolidated at Philadelphia. But the French Catholics, in return for the Quebec Act, remained loyal to England in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. Later they profited by the success and growth of the United States, and by the bitter lesson the British Parliament had learned from the great event of 1776. Fear of losing Canada first, and later common sense and necessity, led the British Government to extend to other provinces the autonomy accorded Quebec, and to consolidate Canada into a self-governing dominion. With the exception of Newfoundland and Labrador, the British possessions north of the United States are to all intents and purposes independent. Canada signed the treaties of the Paris settlement after the World War, and has recently decided to have diplo-

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matic representation at Washington distinct from the British Embassy.

When the United States became independent, the interior of the continent, west and south of the regions over which Great Britain had established her political control, were nominally Spanish, with a French enclave at the mouth of the Mississippi. All the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, including the peninsula of Florida, belonged to Spain. Great Britain, France, Spain, Holland, and Denmark divided the islands of the West Indies. Great Britain had a foothold on the Caribbean coast, south of Yucatan, for the exploitation of hardwood forests. In South America, Great Britain, France, and Holland had mainland colonies on the Atlantic coast, between Portuguese Brazil and Spanish Venezuela. With the exception of Brazil, Spain held title to most of the American continent from the basin of the Mississippi to Cape Horn and Tierra del Fuego, including most of the islands close to the coast, such as Cuba and Trinidad.

The great convulsion in Europe began a few months after Washington was inaugurated first President of the United States. It lasted for over twenty years and may justly be said to have affected more radically the destiny of America than that of Europe. As we look back upon the French revolution and the Napoleonic Wars with the perspective

of a century, we realize that Great Britain's opposition to the attempt of France to dominate Europe resulted in the establishment of the United States upon a firm foundation and in the disappearance of European overlordship in the New World. America's profit from the gigantic struggle that ended in 1815 was as unquestioned as the advantage that came from the next Armageddon a hundred years later. The New World freed itself in the first instance from the political yoke of Europe, and in the second instance from the financial yoke of Europe. In neither case was the result immediately accomplished; but in both cases the duration of the war and the consequent exhaustion of the European participants made the result inevitable.

The treaties following the Napoleonic Wars confirmed changes of title accomplished by conquest during the long struggle. To Great Britain were ceded Trinidad and other Caribbean islands by Spain and a part of Guiana by Holland.

The transfer of titles from one European power to another, however, was of trifling importance compared to the tremendously significant changes brought about by the disasters that fell upon Spain.

Spain was undermined by allies and enemies and colonists alike. France and Great Britain, in fighting each other, deprived Spain of all her power on land and sea, and left her after the Treaty of

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Vienna (1815) not only shorn of vast territories, but also impotent to put up a good fight against rebels in Mexico and Central and South America.

Early in the struggle Spain had been compelled to cede her rights over the Mississippi and Missouri valleys, the heart of North America, to France. Because he was unable to defend this acquisition from the British, Napoleon sold the title he had acquired from Spain to the United States in 1804.

The British occupied Florida, and when they returned it to Spain, the Spanish Government was so weak, faced with revolutions everywhere, that it was unable even to hold the Seminole Indians in check, and gladly sold the peninsula to the United States.

The territory contiguous to the Louisiana Purchase, with a vague frontier extending to the Pacific coast and south to Yucatan, proclaimed its independence in 1810.

During the decade from 1810 to 1820 all the Latin American mainland countries rebelled against Spain, as Mexico had done. The Spanish fleet had been destroyed by the British at Trafalgar, and the Spanish army, fighting first for the French and then for the English in Spain, had become completely disorganized. The only hope Spain had, after the Napoleonic Wars, of reëstablishing her authority in America on the mainland was by the help of

other European powers. Although the continental powers were inclined to go to the aid of Spain, Great Britain refused to agree to a joint action. She controlled the sea. European intervention in Latin America was impracticable in view of Britain's veto.

The triumph of British sea-power, which effectively blocked French activities in the New World, despite the fact that the United States became involved in the war on sea against Great Britain, was the principal influence in preventing European interference with the independent development of all the American republics during their infancy. Had Nelson failed at Trafalgar, the history of the United States as well as of Canada and Latin America might have been changed. Backed by the resources of continental Europe, Spain and France, allies, might easily have been able to devote their energies to overseas expansion. Spain might have consolidated her precarious hold upon her American empire, and France might have recovered her foothold in North America. But her inability to send troops to America at the heyday of Napoleon's power and glory demonstrated France's dreams of empire in the New World were irrevocably shattered. The only positive loss was that of the island of Haiti, which proclaimed its independence in 1804 and which Napoleon failed to

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reconquer. But when the French and Spanish fleets were destroyed off Cape St. Vincent France and Spain lost forever the possibility of remaining—or becoming again—sovereign powers in the New World.

From the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 down to the present time the countries of America have been gradually emancipating themselves from European control. The action of Great Britain in refusing to accede to the proposal of joint intervention in America to reëstablish Spanish authority gave the United States the opportunity in 1823 to promulgate the Monroe Doctrine. With the exception of the Falkland Islands, over which Great Britain established effective control in 1834, no European nation has increased its possessions on or around North and South America since the United States took the stand that the American people would not allow the extension of existing or the restoration of former European political sovereignty in any part of the New World.

It was inevitable that the United States should become the dominant power in the New World, inevitable simply because the zone behind the thirteen original colonies of the republic, straight across the continent to the Pacific, was best adapted to settlement and development by Europeans. For many decades after the United States assumed the rôle

of defender of the two Americas against European encroachment, the Monroe Doctrine could not have been enforced without the tacit consent of Great Britain. It suited British policy, however, not to challenge the Monroe Doctrine. The United States was building up a powerful country in which the English language was spoken and British stock predominated, and which was being developed along the lines of Anglo-Saxon political and social ideals. Then, too, Great Britain had all the territory she wanted in the New World, and it was distinctly to her advantage that other European powers be barred from seeking colonies and naval stations on the American mainland or in islands around the Americas.

In the course of her expansion to the Pacific the United States came into conflict with Great Britain over the Northwestern boundary. The dispute was amicably settled. With Mexico a war was fought over Texas, which, after having separated from Mexico, wanted to join the United States. This war led to the "rounding out" of the territory of the United States by establishing a southern boundary on a conventional line west from the Rio Grande to the Pacific.

At the expense of a Latin American people the United States succeeded in obtaining a zone across the Isthmus of Panama when a canal was con-

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structed there at the beginning of the twentieth century; and on the eve of the World War the United States occupied and took over the administration of the Haitian and Dominican Republics.

By purchase the United States acquired Alaska and the Aleutian Islands from Russia in 1867 and the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917. The boundary between Alaska and Canada, like that between British Columbia and Oregon, was for a long time a matter of controversy, and was settled by arbitration.

The Spanish-American War was the only conflict between an American country and a European power during the hundred years preceding the World War. It was provoked by the chronic rebellions against Spain in the island of Cuba, and it ended in the final elimination of Spain from America. The independence of Cuba was recognized by Spain, and Porto Rico was ceded to the United States.

CHAPTER III

REMAINING EUROPEAN POSSESSIONS IN THE NEW WORLD AFTER THE WORLD WAR

THE only part of the world unaffected territorially by the war of 1914-18 was the Western Hemisphere. The defeated powers had no possessions there; so the two American continents, although most of the countries in them signed the treaties, remained as they were before the war in so far as boundaries and titles were concerned.

It was impossible, however, that the World War should not have made some changes in America. Canada and the British and French colonies had been belligerents from the very beginning of the war. Before the end of the third year the United States intervened, and her example was followed by most of the other American republics. No land engagements were fought in America, and only two naval battles. But the war marked a change in the relations of American countries to Europe in three ways: Canada gained the status of virtual independence, or at least equality with the mother-country in the British Empire; for the first time in

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her history the United States sent an army to fight in Europe; and most of the Latin American countries signed and ratified treaties which had to do almost exclusively with the particular interests of European nations, and these countries entered the League of Nations. In view of the fact that the United States neither ratified the treaty nor entered the League, the independent action of Latin American countries sensibly modified the rôle of defender and spokesman in the affairs of American countries unilaterally assumed by the United States under the Monroe Doctrine.

Just what is the extent of European power and influence in the Western Hemisphere in the twentieth century?

We have not yet arrived at the place where the profound changes in the economic relations of Europe to America can be properly estimated. We cannot go farther than to say that there was general liquidation of German investment holdings and business enterprises in most American countries, and that Allied and neutral European investments decreased. Business relations with Europe changed in that American countries sold to Europe much more than they bought from Europe, and became—temporarily, at least—seemingly creditors where they had always before been debtors. This change

was particularly noticeable in the United States and Canada.

In estimating America's place in the world it is necessary to consider the present extent of political control and sovereign rights exercised and enjoyed by European countries in North and South America.

The only European power that has managed to obtain and increase its holdings in America since the foundation of the United States is Great Britain. The British have lost no territory in America since they recognized the independence of the thirteen revolting colonies in the Treaty of Paris in 1783. On the contrary, they have been remarkably successful in developing their remaining possessions; and they have added territory at the expense of Spain and Holland.

The status of the Dominion of Canada, which contains all the British territory contiguous to the United States and Alaska, has been in transition for several decades. Canada presents the anomaly of a country which is, and at the same time which is not, under the control of Great Britain. As a self-governing dominion of the British Empire, Canada claimed and received independent representation at the Paris Peace Conference. Her delegates signed the treaties of the Paris settlement. For four years Canada has participated as an independent state

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in the League of Nations; and British and Canadians alike vehemently deny that Canada's separate place in the League in any way gives Great Britain an advantage. We are told that Canada has the right to vote as she sees fit in the Assembly of the League and on its various commissions, without regard to the wishes or interests of Great Britain.

But the permanent executive authority in Canada continues to be a governor-general appointed by the British Crown. Canadians travel on British passports; they are represented by British diplomats throughout the world (the separate legation at Washington has not yet been created); they participate in imperial conferences and have a voice in shaping the policies of the British Empire; they have preferential tariffs with the mother-country, and enjoy, on the same footing as the British, special trading privileges with British colonies and protectorates. Canadians are intensely loyal to the British crown. While it is safe to assert that Great Britain could not, if she would, use the Dominion of Canada in furthering purely British policies that might be detrimental to the interests of the Canadians themselves (of this the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance is an example), British sovereignty over Canada still remains a distinct benefit to Great Britain. It puts other European nations and the United States at a disadvantage in

trading with Canada and in coöperating in the exploitation of Canada. And the good will of Canada, as was proved in the World War, is an extremely valuable asset to Great Britain.

Newfoundland, with the Labrador coast, is also a British possession inhabited by people mostly of British stock; and is therefore virtually self-governing, and presents no colonial problem. Newfoundland, like Canada, is an asset to Great Britain with no liabilities to offset its value. Since fishing difficulties that had been an outstanding dispute between Great Britain and France for a hundred and fifty years were amicably settled by the agreement of 1904, Great Britain has been in absolute control of the most valuable fishing region in the world. For the use of these fishing-grounds the United States and European countries are dependent upon British good will.

British sovereignty over the Dominion of Canada and Newfoundland compels the United States to recognize that she is not independent of all other powers. The disproportion that will probably always exist between the population of the United States and Canada makes it unnecessary for the United States to feel insecure because of thousands of miles of a conventional and unfortified northern frontier. In case of a war in which we are a participant, even if that war were with Great Britain,

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we should not have to fear Canada. But in a war with Great Britain or any other European power, or in a European war in which we were neutral, the sovereignty of Great Britain over the northern part of North America is a fact with which we should have to reckon. Great Britain is on our shortest path to Europe. As the World War proved, she is able to lay down and interpret the laws of the sea as she sees fit. Our best route to Europe passes close to Halifax, a naval base of the first importance. And in the future, when the States bordering on the Great Lakes become accustomed to route their overseas traffic by the St. Lawrence River, Great Britain will control both banks of the outlet of a vast region of another country to the sea, putting a part of the United States in the same relation to Canada as a part of Germany is to Holland and Belgium, and as Belgium is to Holland.

The other possessions of Great Britain on the mainland of America are held in a much more absolute sense than is Canada. British Honduras is a crown colony on the Caribbean Sea between Yucatan and Guatemala. Its international status as a colony of the British crown was proclaimed in 1862. It is a possession of trifling value, comparatively speaking. But it gives the British a foothold in Central America and on the Caribbean

coast. British Guiana lies between Dutch Guiana and Venezuela. The boundary line is not far from the mouth of the Orinoco River, off the delta of which lies the British island of Trinidad. The British took this territory from Holland during the Napoleonic Wars. The danger of having a European power on the mainland of South America, in this strategic position, was demonstrated in Cleveland's second administration when we very nearly had to go to war with Great Britain over British claims against Venezuela. Just as British Honduras is a hindrance to the free development of Guatemala, British Guiana (and Dutch and French Guiana) are hindrances to the natural development of Venezuela and Brazil.

The West Indies are still largely under European sovereignty. Here again Great Britain is most advantageously located and holds the lion's share. If we include the Bermudas, we have a chain of seven groups of British colonies, extending from six hundred miles off North Carolina nearly to the coast of Venezuela. The Bermudas, the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica and surrounding islands, the Leeward Islands, the Windward Islands, and Trinidad and Tobago are British sentinels between the Atlantic and Caribbean, ideally located on the paths of ocean traffic, making it easy for the British to control every approach from North and South

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America and Europe to the Panama Canal. To go from New York to Cuba and Porto Rico one passes British islands. British Trinidad lies at the mouth of the Orinoco River.

Three hundred miles east of the Magellan Straits are two large and a hundred small islands, and several outlying groups, which Great Britain owns under the name of the Falkland Islands. The southern tips of Africa and America are not so important as they were before the cutting of the Suez and Panama Canals. But the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn will always be important ocean passages. In Africa, Great Britain controls both the canal at one end and the cape at the other. In America, the United States has cut and owns the canal, but she does not control its approaches; and Great Britain, through the Falkland Islands, is in a position to guard the Magellan Straits. The importance of the Falklands was demonstrated during the World War. After the battle of Coronel, off the coast of Chile, the victorious German admiral had no base for coaling and provisioning and for wireless communication. It was inevitable that the British, enjoying the use of a base of their own, should have caught him off the Falklands.

France's possessions in the New World comprise, in addition to her portion of Guiana, two little

islands near the Newfoundland fishing bank, St.-Pierre and Miquelon, and eight islands in the West Indies. The two islands of Guadeloupe are surrounded by five others; Martinique is alone. Though few in number, the French West Indies are valuable possessions. France is inordinately proud of the little that remains of her once vast empire in America. Holland, owning Curaçao and five small islands, completes the list of European title-holders in America.

Great Britain and the United States are on the best of terms, and we have every reason to believe that the fundamental community of interests and ideals among the English-speaking peoples is a guarantee that British holdings in America are not a potential menace to the security of American countries. France and Holland are too inferior in naval power to the United States for their American possessions to cause us worry.

But we must face frankly the fact that the presence of European powers as sovereign states in America makes it impossible for the people of the United States and the Latin American countries to feel free from the repercussion in the New World of European political complications and economic competition. With Great Britain, France, and Holland in the West Indies and the Caribbean and on the coast of South America between Brazil

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and Venezuela; with Great Britain near the Straits of Magellan, at the mouth of the Orinoco, on the Caribbean littoral, in controlling positions on all the routes from the Atlantic Ocean to the Panama Canal, off the coast of Florida and North Carolina, across the northern half of North America, and bordering the shortest transatlantic route—the American countries must confess that they are not supreme in their own continents.

The communications of Argentina with the Pacific coast of South America and with Europe; of Brazil with the North Atlantic and the Pacific; of Venezuela and Colombia with Europe and the United States; of Central America and Mexico with Europe; of the United States with Europe and Latin American; of the two coasts of the United States via the Panama Canal—all these vital routes are under the constant surveillance and the potential menace of European powers.

The two powers that are supreme in Africa and Asia can also determine who is to use the Panama Canal. They can enforce their own ideas in time of war as to the rights and privileges of neutrals and belligerents. Their wireless stations enable them to know what the American countries are saying to one another and to spy upon the movements of American fleets. Any war in which they were involved would instantly affect areas vital to

us in the New World, especially if these two powers were fighting each other.

The Venezuelan crisis with Great Britain illustrates how European overlordship of American territory renders possible war between the United States and her closest friend in Europe. The use of the Bahamas and Nova Scotia and of St.-Pierre and Miquelon as bases for rum-running demonstrates how territories under European sovereignty in close proximity to the United States may hamper the Washington Government in its efforts to enforce our laws. The question has not been the same with self-governing Canada, whose sympathy with the United States and eagerness to establish a reciprocal interest with us in the enforcement of laws have made easy mutual arrangements for the protection of both countries. But sovereignty exercised overseas has compelled the United States to put up with intolerable conditions. It happened that a large number of Americans did not have much sympathy with the Eighteenth Amendment and connived with the rum-runners. But other forms of smuggling are conceivable, the exercise of our right to prevent which might involve us in diplomatic tangles with European powers.

The high-powered motor-boat; the submarine; the airplane; wireless telegraphy; our special interests in Cuba and Haiti and the titles we have

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acquired to Porto Rico and the Panama Canal; the vital place the canal has taken in our national life; the construction of a new canal across Nicaragua—these new factors of the last quarter-century make the problem of European control of New-World territory a more difficult and complicated one than it was before 1900. The time is fast approaching when the United States will regard European sovereignty in the West Indies as an anomaly that must disappear, and when the Latin American countries will take the same attitude toward the Guiana enclave, Trinidad and Tobago, and the Falkland Islands. A clearer definition also will be required of the relations between Canada and Great Britain.

We see ahead in the twentieth century the gradual loss by European powers of their remaining titles in the Western Hemisphere. Because the American countries will demand a general liquidation and because the European owners will be unable to defend the titles, the forcing of Europe out of America is bound to go on until the last European title has been given up. This is a field for constructive American statesmanship.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLICY OF ISOLATION

THE refusal to take sides or become involved in any way in the internal political quarrels of Europe is known as the isolation policy. It is the oldest doctrine of American foreign policy, and it was defined by example during the first decade of our national life and by precept in Washington's farewell address. Since the foundation of the republic, in every crisis that has arisen in the relations of America with Europe, the isolation doctrine has been reaffirmed and has met with the approval of the American people.

Our intervention in the World War was not an infringement of this traditional policy. The executive and legislative branches of the Government in the declaration of war against Germany, and the various departments of the Government in the conduct of the war, scrupulously observed the doctrine of isolation. We entered into no alliance; we contributed no funds to a common war-chest; and we stubbornly refused the suggestions made by the French and British general staffs that

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American troops be battalioned in the French and British armies and act as a general reservoir of reinforcements.

When the history of American participation in the World War is written, our children will be impressed with the meticulous care taken and the wisdom shown by their fathers in avoiding even the appearance of "entangling alliances" during and after the World War. In official communications the other Governments at war with Germany were invariably referred to as "associates," not as "allies," and we kept strict books of every advance in cash or material made to them. We did not sign the Pact of London pledging ourselves not to make a separate peace with Germany.

From the moment we broke off diplomatic relations with Germany to the conclusion of the Armistice, not a single note was exchanged with any of the other belligerents, not a single understanding was entered into either in writing or orally, binding this country to automatic common action in the conduct of the war or of the peace negotiations. We were never allies of the Entente Powers. We were not partners in secret treaties or in dickers. At the beginning of our intervention the American Government made clear its attitude, which was that we were willing to coöperate with the Entente Powers because they were fighting enemies that were

also our enemies; but we were not intervening in the war to help them secure whatever objects they had in mind for themselves. We declared war against Germany because we were prompted to do so in order to defend our own national interests. When the war was over, ipso facto American collaboration with the Entente Powers ceased.

Had President Wilson stayed in Washington and directed the conduct of the peace negotiations from the vantage-point he occupied during the war, the European powers—and a large section of American public opinion—would not have been misled as to the constitutional limitations placed upon our coöperation with European nations. American interests would not have been lost sight of. There would have been no confusion as to the nature of the obligations and responsibilities the United States was in a position to accept. Our Army of Occupation went to the Rhineland, and remained there, in accordance with the terms of the Armistice. It was a military, not a political, measure. The attempt later to embroil us in a purely European question necessarily led to the hasty withdrawal of the Army of Occupation.

These facts need to be emphasized. They are forgotten or ignored by those who argue that the United States, by failing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and by making a separate peace with

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Germany, abandoned her comrades in arms. Ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, which contains the Covenant of the League of Nations, implied the participation of the United States in guaranteeing a peace settlement wholly to the interests of certain European powers, a peace settlement that gave territorial gains and advantages to the Entente Powers and nothing at all to the United States. The American Senate simply respected the unbroken precedent followed since the time of Washington of avoiding entangling alliances.

It is argued plausibly enough that conditions have changed and that isolation is no longer advisable or possible. But for so radical a change very good reasons must be given. None is competent to urge upon Americans the abandonment of a cardinal doctrine of American foreign policy unless he has studied the genesis of the doctrine and is familiar with its application, and unless he is in a position to demonstrate that the interests of the United States demand forsaking now what has been a source of strength and benefit in the past. To plead Europe's need of us is not enough. Traditions are not lightly to be cast aside. Dreamers and enthusiasts have a tendency to dismiss without consideration the lessons of experience and to assume that their particular panacea has never been tried before.

Before we decide to abandon any doctrine of our foreign policy, which has been tested and found good by successive generations, we want to be sure that we have found something better, better not for others but for ourselves.

Great Britain formally acknowledged the independence of the United States in 1783. Six years passed before the thirteen colonies adopted and ratified a constitution and were ready to enter the family of nations as the United States. The time was not wasted. The period of discussion, dissension, protest, and reconciliation of divergent views bore fruit in a document that has stood the test of succeeding generations and changing conditions. We must regard the first ten amendments as an integral part of the Constitution; for ratification was contingent upon their adoption. The infant state was confronted with the question of participation in a European conflict from the very moment of its birth. In Washington's two administrations foreign propagandists and American sympathizers with France and Great Britain worked hard to involve the United States on one side or the other. Partizans of France argued that the Revolution embodied American ideals and that gratitude to France for her recent services in helping us free ourselves from the British yoke demanded payment of our debt to France. British

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partizans argued that we were bound to help Great Britain because of our common blood and religion and culture. Washington successfully, but with great difficulty, opposed both currents. He asked himself one question and only one question: is intervention to the advantage of the United States? Seeing no advantage, but many disadvantages and dangers, he stood resolutely for neutrality.

It was this experience that prompted him to offer his farewell advice to his compatriots. The question of our pulling France's or Great Britain's chestnuts out of the fire was still before the people. Washington had realized how partizanship affected the judgment of the best of Americans, such as Jefferson and Hamilton, neither of whom had been able to think straight on this question. The reason he gave for cautioning his fellow-countrymen against espousing the cause of any European nation was simply that undue or exaggerated friendship or hatred for another nation handicapped Americans in seeing clearly the interests of their own country.

Washington wanted the citizens of the newly founded United States to devote their energies to its upbuilding. The fact that they were transplanted into a new world gave them the opportunity to free themselves of the burden that weighed down upon European nations. Why should the United

States become involved in European quarrels, caused by fear and jealousy among neighbors and nourished by traditional wrongs and hatreds that had not been outlived? It was common sense that a country far from the European maelstrom should not deliberately enter it. Only if we were able to affirm that there had been a radical change in the relations among European countries since the day of Washington should we be able to argue that the time had come for the United States to disregard Washington's admonition. It is ridiculous to plead for an abandonment of a policy of isolation on the ground that Washington had in mind a weak and struggling nation and that he did not foresee the greatness of his country and the radical transformation of international relations through the development of communications, and through economic interdependence. Washington, from his practical experience as President, was thinking of the tendency of human nature to love and to hate to excess.

None can deny that the United States avoided the danger that might have proved fatal by adopting the policy of isolation in Washington's day. During the century and a quarter since the death of Washington has there ever been an occasion when the vital interests of the American people would have been advanced by disregarding Wash-

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ington's farewell advice? To answer this question we must review the occasions when we had the temptation or opportunity to become involved in European conflicts and when our sympathy or active coöperation was solicited as it is being solicited to-day.

Twelve years after Washington's death we were forced into a war with Great Britain through the disregard of neutral rights on the high seas. British interference with our commerce was a blow at American prosperity. Then, too, the people of the United States were uneasy because of results that might confront them through changes of sovereignty in the New World. The British had carried the war to America. They had occupied Florida and some of the West Indies. They had seized part of Dutch Guiana. They had sent an expedition to occupy Buenos Aires and had gone up the La Plata River to Montevideo. There were rumors that they intended to occupy the Mississippi valley and contest the title conveyed by France to the United States. But although we declared war against Great Britain, we did not become the ally of France, and we did not make any move to interfere in European affairs. In the same year that the second Treaty of Vienna was signed, the treaty that marked the definite defeat of France and elimination of Napoleon, we made a separate peace

with our particular enemy, who was one of the victorious allies in the European coalition against France.

At various times during the nineteenth century attempts were made to get the United States to make official pronouncements on the merits of European moot questions. We were the haven for German revolutionists, who launched a propaganda in America against Prussia. Kossuth came to New York to enlist American aid in Hungary's struggle for independence. Twice within a decade senators and representatives at Washington were canvassed to secure the passage of a resolution recognizing before it was a *fait accompli* the unification of Italy. No less a distinguished American than Abraham Lincoln (before he became President) was induced by admirers of Garibaldi to indorse irredentist claims against Austria. Lincoln did not realize the perplexing seriousness of economic and political problems in the Adriatic, and he had not investigated the merits of conflicting claims, when he generously declared that no people were fit to lord it over other people. More than sixty years before the Treaties of St.-Germain, Trianon, and Rapallo, the Trieste and Fiume questions were brought before the State Department by zealous American champions of a "downtrodden European people."

The abortive effort of Napoleon III to revive the

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glory of the First Empire was followed anxiously in this country, and its danger was brought home to us by the fear that France might intervene in the Civil War in favor of the Confederacy and by the menace to us from the invasion of Mexico in the midst of that life-and-death struggle. After the surrender of Lee at Appomattox the United States was compelled to send a stiff note to France on the Mexican question. But when France withdrew her support of Maximilian our interest in the imperial ambitions of Napoleon ended; and although public opinion in the United States, as in England, was, generally speaking, on the side of Germany in the War of 1870, we were officially neutral. American liberals, indignant over the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, reacted to the German abuse of victory. Voices were raised in protest against the Treaty of Frankfort, but General Grant's administration made no comment one way or the other.

In the face of a changing world, the consistent maintenance of the policy of isolation since the Civil War is striking. It furnishes food for thought to those Americans who now dream of its abandonment. Only because we are closer to the events is it asserted that what has happened during the last decade in the Old World affects us more vitally than what happened before. When we study the crises in the affairs of European nations,

and note how uniform has been the attitude of successive administrations and Congresses every time the question has arisen, we realize how hopeless is the cause now being advocated by enthusiasts to whom the history of their country furnishes no lesson.

The United States has always been foremost in willingness to meet other nations in conferences to advance the cause of arbitration, to establish the reign of international law, and to participate in organizations where international machinery is essential. But we have fought shy of political conferences. Algeciras is an exception that proves the rule: the scope of the participation of our delegates was carefully defined beforehand; and our ratification of the agreement contained the rider that the United States did not assume any obligation to aid in enforcing its provisions.

The instructions given to the American delegates to the two Hague Conferences set forth clearly the traditional American policy of refusal to be drawn into political agreements—even into discussion of political matters—affecting European relations with European states. In its acceptance of the invitations to the Hague Conferences, the American Government notified the world that the United States stood ready to coöperate in certain definite undertakings for promotion of international good will

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and harmonious international relations, but that its participation was limited to the discussion of definite subjects on the agenda. Similarly, when the invitation to the Washington Conference was issued, the agenda was appended, and the secretary of state declared that the subjects of discussion and agreements proposed should not be enlarged in scope nor should they be considered in connection with other subjects or political issues. At both Hague Conferences and at the Washington Conference efforts were made by the European powers not only to introduce questions of purely European concern but to use the subjects on the agenda for the purpose of involving the United States in these questions. The same course was followed at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

At the Hague and at Washington the American delegates opposed a formal *non possumus* to proposals and suggestions of this character. At Paris, where the negotiating power was wholly in the hands of President Wilson, the European states were successful in getting the signature of our delegates to agreements that infringed in letter and spirit the traditional policy of isolation. But thanks to the wise check placed by the Constitution of the United States upon the power of the executive in concluding agreements with other nations, the Senate was able to reaffirm the isolation policy. Mr.

Wilson appealed to the country against the Senate in the 1920 election. Public opinion, although not unfavorable to the general conception of a League of Nations, sustained the Senate against the President by an unprecedented majority.

Mr. Wilson announced that the election of 1920 was to be "a solemn referendum." The question of abandoning our isolation policy was put squarely before the people, the Democratic platform and the Democratic Presidential candidate in his speeches upholding Mr. Wilson's contention that the Treaty of Versailles and the Covenant of the League of Nations ought to be ratified without reservation, and the Republican platform and the Republican Presidential candidate asserting that the Paris settlement and the League Covenant should **not** be accepted without reservations fully safeguarding the freedom of the United States.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the issue in the 1920 election was not the acceptance or rejection of the League of Nations pure and simple. Many leading Republicans supported Mr. Harding on the ground of their belief that his election would bring about, rather than destroy the hopes of, American participation in an international organization to improve relations among nations and lessen the chances of war. Few senators, and not all of them Republicans, had been irreconcilables. The Treaty

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of Versailles failed of ratification solely because of Mr. Wilson's insistence upon the League of Nations without reservations. The issue, therefore, was the choice between coöperation with other nations in accordance with our traditions and the spirit and letter of the Constitution and blind entry into what might easily become (if it was not actually that at the time) an alliance with certain European powers to further their European and world interests against the European and world interests of other powers.

If, during the four years that have elapsed, the League of Nations has become for the people of the United States a closed issue, is it not because the tragic succession of events in Europe has irresistibly recommended to the American people the wisdom of holding fast to the policy of their fathers?

Isolation does not mean refusal to coöperate with other nations in enacting and putting into execution measures or policies for the common good of all nations. But it does mean, as it always has meant, unwillingness to be bound automatically to any course of action that might diminish our prestige and influence and that might menace our security and prosperity.

CHAPTER V

OUR MAINLAND AND ISLAND NEIGHBORS

UNTIL after the Civil War the United States possessed no detached territories. The union of the colonies under Federal Government was originally achieved on the basis of the equality and autonomy of the thirteen contracting parties. As the Union expanded new States were formed, to each of which was granted the privileges guaranteed by the Constitution to the original States. It was soon realized, however, that there could be differences of opinion in interpreting the individual rights of the States under the Constitution and that their relations to the Federal Government called for modifying adjustments. Expansion westward and the creation of new States made the problem acute. Complicated as it became by the question of slavery, in which the economic interests of the States were at variance, a war to test the indissolubility of the Union was inevitable. But as yet the United States was contiguous territory, and there were no dependencies with an anomalous status.

Had the slavery issue not divided the States, it is

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probable that the United States would have been led into an aggressive policy in the West Indies and the Caribbean and would have attempted the construction of an Atlantic-Pacific canal in the middle of the nineteenth century. But the extension of American sovereignty or "influence" over Cuba and a canal zone, which was a more vital issue in the days of sailing-vessels and prairie-wagons and Indians than in the later era of steam transportation, was not allowed to come within the realm of practical politics because of the fear that pursuit of such a policy would lead to strengthening the slave States.

When we try to put ourselves back into the three decades preceding the Civil War, it is nothing short of a miracle—or, rather, it is an eloquent testimony to the power of unconscious instinct in the development of political organisms—that the United States made the Louisiana Purchase, received Texas into the Union, fought the war with Mexico, and resisted the effort of Great Britain to extend her sovereignty on the Pacific south of the conventional line westward from the Great Lakes. So many opportunities were seized that might have been missed that it would be expecting too much to emphasize lost opportunities in the Caribbean or to stress the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 with Great Britain concerning the future Atlantic-Pacific canal.

Two years after the conclusion of the Civil War,

Alaska and the Aleutian Islands were purchased from Russia, eliminating that power from North America. Alaska became a Territory in 1912.

The first overseas possession of the United States was the harbor of Pago Pago, on the Samoan island of Tutuila, which was ceded by a native ruler to the United States for a naval and coaling station in 1872. American rights in Samoa, however, were not definitely settled and internationally recognized until the tripartite treaty of 1899, in which the United States and Germany divided the Samoan Islands with the consent of Great Britain. Soon after the beginning of the World War the German portion of the islands was occupied by the British and was held as conquered territory. German Samoa in 1920 was assigned by the League of Nations as a mandated territory to the Dominion of New Zealand.

The Hawaiian Islands were annexed by the United States in 1898, and were constituted as the Territory of Hawaii in 1900.

The Spanish-American War brought to the United States Porto Rico, the Philippine Islands, Guam, and Cuba, later made independent. The Virgin Islands, in the West Indies, were purchased from Denmark in 1917. When the completion of the Panama Canal was undertaken by the American Government, the Republic of Panama granted the

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United States, in perpetuity, control of five miles on either side of the Panama Canal, together with the valleys of feeding streams and the islands in Panama Bay. The Canal Zone, as it is called, is virtually American territory, and on it the United States has erected fortifications for the defense of the canal.

In the early days of her history the United States had as neighbors Great Britain, Spain, and France. When we made our first extension of sovereignty over non-contiguous territory by the purchase of Alaska, Japan was still in her infancy as a world power. We did not realize then, nor have we realized since, that Japan thus became our neighbor. Even now the people of the United States as a whole do not think in terms of our extended possessions. If the question were asked, how many would answer correctly that the three European powers, neighbors at the beginning of our national life, have given place to the self-governing dominions of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia; Holland; Japan; Russia and the American republics of Mexico, Panama, Haiti, and Santo Domingo. Spain has been eliminated from the American continent; Great Britain and France are still neighbors, but in a different sense than they were originally. The probability of another ship-canal through Central America has brought Nicaragua

into close relations with the United States. Cuba is independent, through American intervention, but with certain conditions that make the new republic rather a protectorate than an independent neighbor.

As we are now constituted, we have fourteen other countries as neighbors. In various kinds of colonial problems we are in contact with the European powers and Japan, and our own interests are now demanding that we watch constantly the evolution of the most important problems of world politics and adopt a policy concerning them.

Let us enumerate a few of these problems and see how our obligations and interests as neighbors are involved in them.

1. *The present status of Great Britain as an empire, and Britain's future.* This is a concern of ours of first-rank importance. The Dominion of Canada, inhabited by people of our own background and language, is a neighbor and an independent voting member of the League of Nations. What is the tie connecting Canada with Great Britain? Do the political and economic relations of Canada and the United States involve Great Britain and the United States? Since the building of the Panama Canal and the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, British islands off the American coast and in the West Indies have called for our careful consideration. What is the authority of London

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over a crown colony? What are the relations of the crown colonies with British self-governing dominions? The success of our European and Asiatic immigration policies, as well as of the Eighteenth Amendment, may very well depend upon the answer to these questions. In Samoa and the Philippines we are neighbors of territories administered by British dominions under League mandates. Is Great Britain the real master of these territories? What would be the situation in case of war? Our possession of the Philippines makes us consider also Great Britain's sovereignty over Hong Kong, Singapore, North Borneo, and Sarawak.

2. *The colonial future of France and Holland.* France has vast mainland and Holland vast island possessions in close proximity to the Philippines. We cannot afford to neglect the study of France and Holland overseas. In a new European war a German-Russian-Japanese combination could undoubtedly expel France from Indo-China. If Holland were involved on the side of Germany, she would lose the Dutch East Indies to Great Britain. If she were involved on the side of France and Great Britain, she might lose them to Japan. If she remained neutral, a second experience like that of 1914-18, with Russia and Japan as allies of Germany, might lead to a disruption of Dutch authority in the East Indies that would have a se-

rious repercussion in the Philippines. If France became involved in a war with Great Britain, we should be confronted with the probability of a serious increase of British influence in the Far East and in the Caribbean. It is absurd to contend that eventualities of this character could not arise. If we intend to retain the Philippines and the Panama Canal, ought not the United States to announce to the world that the transfer of titles from one European power to another or from a European power to Japan would not be tolerated either in the Far East or in the West Indies?

3. *The relations of Latin American republics with the United States and Europe.* How we treat Mexico and the Central American states and our policy toward Cuba, Haiti, and Santo Domingo are factors that cannot be ignored in our relations with the South American countries. The membership of Latin American countries in the League of Nations (Mexico may soon become a member) has given rise to a problem to which we cannot much longer remain indifferent. If we do not ourselves enter the League of Nations, there will have to be an explicit reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine and a warning that Latin American republics will not be allowed to carry their disputes before a political organization in which we have no part.

4. *Japan's position as a world power.* During

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the last quarter-century there has been a striking similarity between the United States and Japan in the awakening to what we might call world consciousness. From opposite sides of the Pacific the two powers have expanded. Provoked to this expansion by a sudden conviction that their security depended upon exercising a controlling interest in neighboring countries, Japan and the United States have grown in strength and influence, have been led into adventures and entanglements that they had not foreseen; and they have come into contact, if not into conflict, in the Asiatic waters of the Pacific and China. Our ability to get ahead of Japan and to discount her potential enmity has been due to the fact that certain European powers had an interest more or less identical with ours in keeping Japan bottled up. But during two decades Japan was the ally of Great Britain, became a participant in the European War, and found that she could make herself a factor in international affairs. Her statesmen not only abandoned the policy of isolation, but they played the diplomatic game with European powers along conventional lines. We failed to realize the implications of Japan's intervention in the World War. Not all the great powers are parties to the temporary agreements concluded at the Washington Conference. Russia and Germany are not going to re-

main content with their present exclusion from the Far East.

If these two powers adopt the policy, as seems logical, of taking advantage of Japan's real and fancied grievances, are we prepared to consider allying ourselves with other powers to prevent Japan from following the European precedent of seeking and developing overseas outlets for colonization and for exclusive markets and control of raw materials by attempts to extend her political sovereignty?

These four illustrations are sufficient to prove that the expansion of the United States has created situations that involve us willy-nilly in world politics. However much we may instinctively dislike international commitments, alliances, or understandings with other powers, we cannot live in the world as we have helped to make it, we cannot continue to enjoy the privileged position to which we think we have a right, without serious modifications of our traditional foreign policy. We must be close friends with other powers on a *quid pro quo* basis, or must develop our own individual fighting strength to the point where others will not contest our right to what we want.

CHAPTER VI

RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

THE first principle of American foreign policy, formulated in the first decade of our national existence as a result of the European struggle following the French Revolution, was refusal to intervene in European affairs. It was decided that the security and prosperity of the United States demanded avoiding taking sides in European quarrels. Let Europe settle her own affairs! The logical corollary of this attitude was that the United States should not allow European intervention in American affairs. This principle, embodied in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, has prevented the extension of European sovereignty, or the reëstablishment of sovereignty when once lost, in the Western Hemisphere.

The Monroe Doctrine, like the doctrine of isolation, was the result of experience and was adopted in self-defense. The lesson was learned during the Napoleonic Wars. The people of the United States discovered that the transfer of titles from one European power to another menaced their security.

It was not tolerable that we should have a change of neighbors because of wars fought in Europe. Great Britain occupied Florida and sent expeditions to Buenos Aires and New Orleans. The title to the Mississippi Valley changed suddenly from Spain to France, and Great Britain, at war with France, might easily have used that pretext to hem in the United States on the Atlantic seaboard.

While the European powers were engaged in their gigantic conflict, Brazil became the refuge of Portuguese sovereignty, Haiti threw off the yoke of France, and all the rest of Latin America rose in revolt against Spain. South and Central America were formed into a number of republics. Mexico broke away from Spain. It must not be forgotten that the Louisiana Purchase from France still left to Spain a large territory, which had never been colonized and which was penetrated in many places only by missionaries, extending from the Gulf of Mexico across the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific.

Exhausted by years of war during which her seapower had been destroyed and her country invaded and made a battle-ground, Spain was not in a position to reconquer the colonies that had revolted. It was proposed that the European powers help Spain to reëstablish her title. Because of the unwillingness of Great Britain to coöperate in putting

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Latin America back under Spanish sovereignty, the European powers were unable to carry out their plans to act in concert in the New World.

While intervention in America was still being discussed, the Portuguese royal family returned from Rio de Janeiro to Lisbon; and Brazil became a separate empire. This was a setback to the interventionists. It was soon followed by the announcement of the Monroe Doctrine from Washington. The opportunity for keeping South and Central America under European tutelage was lost.

The Monroe Doctrine has been explained and commented upon by historians and students in much the same way as some of Shakespeare's sayings. What was very simple and natural has been made to appear complicated and artificial. What was not in the mind of the man who wrote the announcement of policy has been read into his phrases. Writers of latter days have sometimes felt that the Monroe Doctrine is obsolete and that it ought to be abandoned. They argue from the double ground that the Doctrine is no longer needed to protect America from Europe and that it needlessly offends the Latin American republics, who resent our self-appointed rôle of defender of their interests. Some statesmen (and these include the framers of the Versailles Covenant) confuse the Monroe Doctrine with European "sphere of in-

fluence" arrangements. Others regard it as a contract or treaty.

In view of the curiously reckless treatment of the Monroe Doctrine by those who misunderstand it, a simple statement of what the Doctrine really is seems necessary.

The Monroe Doctrine is no more than a blunt and straightforward announcement that the United States could not afford to allow European powers to establish protectorates or colonies in the continent and a half on which Spain had lost her grip. The new republics could do as they pleased in their relations among themselves. But Europe was to keep hands off and use none of the pretexts that were found convenient in Africa and Asia throughout the nineteenth century to cover and give excuse for the extension of European eminent domain. The motive behind the doctrine was that of making the United States secure from foreign aggression and of enabling us to maintain our isolation policy. Because of the Monroe Doctrine the European powers turned their expansionist energy to Africa and Asia and tried out their imperialistic policies on those continents. The Latin American republics had a chance to pass through the experimental stage in self-government and independence without interference from Europe.

The Monroe Doctrine ought not to be confused

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with the agreements so frequently concluded among European powers for the exploitation of Africa and Asia. It never was an agreement, and it did not have exploitation as its object. When European powers expanded in Africa and Asia, they avoided conflicts with one another by bargainings and mutual concessions. In other words they "divvied up" and recognized one another's "rights" or "special interests" in different regions.

For some reason that has never been explained, President Wilson and the other delegates at the Paris Peace Conference allowed the Monroe Doctrine to be described in the Covenant of the League of Nations as a "regional understanding." This was an absurdly wrong and inaccurate description of the Monroe Doctrine. It was not an understanding but a unilateral declaration of purpose on the part of one nation. European powers and Latin American states were not consulted about it. For a hundred years it had been an accepted fact in international relations only because the United States would at any time have made its infringement a *casus belli*. The action of President Cleveland in regard to Venezuela in 1896 illustrated how firmly imbedded the defense of the Monroe Doctrine was in the national consciousness of the American people.

Whether we could have upheld the doctrine, had

it been challenged, is not to the point. On three occasions, with France about Mexico and with Great Britain and Germany about Venezuela, we threw down the gauntlet; it was not taken up. Despite his exaggerated consciousness of power, Napoleon III did not want to engage in a war with the United States over Mexico just after our Civil War. His intrigues at Mexico City and the setting up of the empire under European control and backed by French soldiers had been undertaken when we were engaged in a life-and-death struggle and presupposed that the outcome of the war would be the disruption of the American Union. But although the North was exhausted, the South had unconditionally surrendered. Not only had we the advantage of being near Mexico, but the victorious North possessed a million men trained and equipped for war, very many of whom had been under arms so long that they were loath to return to the pursuits of peace. Our standing army was an argument France could not ignore. In the Venezuelan crises the game was not worth the candle to Great Britain and Germany. What we have to record is the fact that for one hundred years the United States did maintain the Monroe Doctrine, and that we are now in an undoubted position to enforce it against any future European disturber in the Western Hemisphere.

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Since the situation is as it is, why should present-day Americans make light of the Monroe Doctrine, belittle its importance in the past, declare that its usefulness is over, and advocate that we entrust to an organization predominantly European the task we have successfully performed single-handed ever since 1823?

As in the case of the isolation doctrine, the arguments brought up for abandonment of our traditional foreign policy in this particular are unconvincing, to say the least. Zealots are always ready to try some new thing when there is no need for it, urging the abandonment of the old and tried for the new and untried, impatient of wholesome tradition, and arguing from premises that have not been substantiated to a hypothetical conclusion.

Long ago our fathers builded with the idea that the actual leadership of the New World was in Washington. And now there are those who want the United States to surrender her bird in the hand for two in the bush, and to aim for the moral leadership of the world by sending delegates to Geneva!

The serious objection to the Monroe Doctrine is that a mistaken interpretation of it has led proud and self-respecting nations of Latin America to resent our unsolicited—or at least no longer necessary—voluntary obligation of defending their interests and of speaking for them before the European

powers. Here we have a problem to face. Here there is work to be done, and plenty of it. A splendid beginning has been made in bringing the Latin American countries into close and harmonious relations with the United States by the Pan American Union under the able directorship of John Barrett and Leo S. Rowe. These two men and their associates, and an all too small group of Americans interested in the American continents, have accomplished and are accomplishing a great work. And they are being helped by statesmen and university professors and publicists of Latin America.

During the last thirty years six Pan American Conferences have been held with encouraging results, results that have proved that the nations of the New World do not need the advice and guidance—the supervision—of Europe in adjusting their relations with one another. Before the League of Nations came into being the Pan American Conferences had already gone a long way toward settling all international questions that arose among American countries.

Public opinion in America has not as yet awakened, however, to the advantages of a Pan American entente. The Latin American countries have been too much under the cultural influence of Europe and have looked too greatly for economic assistance to Europe. In the past this was in the

nature of things and was due to causes that were in a large measure beyond the control of the United States. We ourselves had to seek capital in Europe, and for more than a century our internal expansion absorbed the energies of the nation.

And yet the fault was partly ours. Without making any serious effort to remedy the situation, we allowed the rapidly developing Latin American republics to look for everything they needed—money, markets, and cultural stimulation—to Europe. We failed to impress upon Latin American countries our willingness and ability to finance their development. We did nothing to encourage business and cultural relations. We were indifferent to loans and concessions. We established no direct and adequate systems of communication by steamship and cable. We neglected to foster the good understanding that would have come from wide-spread banking and trade connections, from interchange of tourists, from constantly keeping in touch with our neighbors.

The past is past. One has no inclination to enter into a post-mortem. But the World War gave us a great opportunity to come into intimate business and social contact with Latin America. For a few years we seized it. The important consideration is not to let it drop now. One of the leading planks in the political platform of our great

parties should be the establishment of close relations with Latin America. This is more important to us than to mix up in the affairs of Europe. There are things that we can do, that we must do, if the United States is to fulfil her destiny and to reap the reward of her intuitively wise foreign policy of the last century. Few duties are more pressing than to bend our energies toward the cultivation of close relations with Latin America.

How can this be done?

1. *By beginning near at home in illustrating our ideals of international relations.* The United States has always said that its people abhorred imperialism and the practice of injustice in dealing with smaller nations. We should like, of course, to see justice reign throughout the earth and to bring the nations together in coöperation on the basis of equality. Well, before we start on Europe, let us try our hand on America. Our dealings with Mexico, with Nicaragua, with Colombia, with Haiti, and with Santo Domingo have left much to be desired and have given rise to justly founded suspicion on the part of other Latin American countries that we ourselves are not much better than those we so roundly condemn for policies of exploitation, arrogance, and the "big stick" in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Until we are willing to deal justly, and with scrupulous attention to correctness in form,

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with our neighbors south of us and in the Caribbean, we shall not enjoy the respect and confidence of South American countries.

2. *By maintaining, with government subsidy if necessary, regular sailings from American ports to all the South American countries.* Before the World War one had to go from New York to Liverpool for a quick and comfortable passage to most South American ports—in fact, to all South American ports; and shipments were frequently routed via England. Across the Atlantic and back! Using Europe as a go-between! Dependent upon ships of foreign registry for mail and freight communications with the West Indies, Central America, and South America! Is it any wonder that Latin Americans were not impressed with the natural hegemony of the United States in the Western Hemisphere or with our desire to get to know them and to do business with them? But now that we have an embarrassment of wealth in shipping, public opinion should demand that our Government, primarily as a matter of vital foreign policy, arrange fast and direct schedules for mail and passenger steamers under the American flag, and see that there is adequate direct service for freights, to and from all Latin American ports. If subsidies are necessary to initiate and maintain communications with the rest of America, by all

means let us grant subsidies. It will be money well spent from the viewpoint of security as well as of prosperity.

3. *By encouraging Latin American countries, large and small, to regard New York as their money center, where loans can be floated, credits arranged, bills of lading discounted and carried, and international exchanges regulated.* During the nineteenth century, and even up to the World War, the United States had little money for investment abroad. Like other American countries, we had developed so rapidly that we sought capital in Europe. From this it resulted that we did business with South America, in large measure at least, through branches of foreign banks in Latin America and New York or indirectly through England. As Liverpool was the key of our communications with Latin America, London was the key of our financial transactions. The World War made us a creditor nation just as it gave us shipping. We must not let slip now one advantage any more than the other. The people must be educated to realize that our foreign policy demands the transfer of Latin America's money center from London to New York. This was temporarily done. But to retain the advantage the American people have to adjust themselves to three new things: subscribing generously to Latin American bond-issues and other in-

vestment offers; aggressively going after business in Latin America; and radically changing our antiquated customs of quoting f.o.b. an American port, of disregarding the metric system, and of refusing to give long-time credit to foreign purchases.

4. *By accustoming ourselves to regard Latin America as a field for travel and study.* Is it not possible to divert a portion of the stream of tourists that flows from the two Americas to Europe? The nature of the development of all American countries made dependence upon Europe logical. We all got into the habit of going to Europe and of ignoring the existence of one another. There were reasons for going to Europe, and it was easy to go there. We should not be surprised that Latin Americans have not found their way in large numbers to us. Why should they, if we do not go to them, and if we have never bothered about developing direct communications? Business follows acquaintance; harmonious relations follow mutual understanding. If there is ever to be a solidarity among American countries, we have to pave the way for it. There is no powerful and untiring agency, governmental or private, in the United States or Latin American countries, whose business it is to foster the tourist trade. Our newspapers have never popularized the regular exchange of news among American countries. If we do not

know one another, it is because we have not tried to.

In the course of time the rôle of the United States may be the "moral leadership of the world." But can we honestly—let alone successfully—aspire to play this rôle before we have exhausted the possibilities, rich and as yet undreamed of, of our own hemisphere? When we realize what we have failed to do, it is ridiculous to regard the Monroe Doctrine in any other light than as a precaution adopted to assure our own security. By implication the doctrine might be held as a dog-in-the-manger policy. How it has worked out not only refutes any such charge but also convicts the American people of failure to take advantage of the legitimate and wholly proper openings for the extension of the influence of the United States that have been ours for the last hundred years. Without aiming to be more than *primus inter pares*, ought we not to cultivate our own neighbors before becoming involved in Old World problems and complications and burdens? The proverb, "The fool's eyes are at the ends of the earth," need not apply to us.

CHAPTER VII

ACTIVITIES IN THE FAR EAST

FEW Americans of the present generation are aware of the intimate connection of the United States with the beginnings of the extension of European eminent domain to the Far East. Our statesmen of the pre-Civil-War period were fully alive to the possibilities of trade with China and Japan. When China first came into contact with European diplomacy backing commerce, we were right on the spot, ready to negotiate treaties. We were responsible ourselves for breaking down the wall of seclusion that Japan had maintained for three hundred years against European civilization. Even before the Oregon boundary was agreed upon with Great Britain and before California became American territory, the American Government was interested in the Far East, and the foundations were laid by the State Department for preventing the United States from being pushed into a position of inferiority in that part of the world.

We had no part in the development of Africa and Middle Asia. There the titles for European

overlordship go back to voyages of discovery and wars of conquest undertaken, to settlements made, to trade contacts initiated, and to foreign policies formulated, before the United States became an independent nation. We did not stake out claims in Australasia.

But in the Far East we were in at the start, and if European powers have outdistanced us and dug themselves in, to our disadvantage, the fault is ours. Only Great Britain was ahead of us among the "treaty powers" in China. Russia's agreements with China, of an earlier date than the nineteenth century, were merely those of a neighbor. We were the first power to sign a treaty with Japan; and when Korea, the "Hermit Kingdom," was opened to foreign intercourse, our State Department negotiated one of the first treaties.

Hong Kong was the sole portion of Chinese territory that had passed under foreign sovereignty or influence when we signed the treaty of 1844, although Portugal, France, and Russia claimed titles that were not confirmed or recognized by treaty. France in Indo-China and Kwang-Chau-Wan; Great Britain on the mainland opposite Hong Kong and Weihaiwei; Russia in Manchuria; Japan in Manchuria, the Liao-tung peninsula, and Korea; Germany in Shantung; and all the European powers in their "concessions" at Canton,

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Shanghai, and Tientsin—these are infringements upon Chinese sovereignty in which the United States might have shared or against which she could have entered an effective protest.

Early in our relations with the Far East we made it a principle of our policy not to seek political aggrandizement for ourselves. But we failed to assert the corollary, that American interests demanded the preservation of Chinese sovereignty intact, and that no transfers of titles or granting of spheres of influence with exclusive concessions should be made to the detriment of our foreign trade. This was mentioned as a desideratum, to be sure, but the expression of a wish is not the announcement of determination. For two generations we kept in closer contact with the Far East than with other parts of the world. But we did nothing to counteract or prevent the growing policy of Europe and Japan to partition China. And during that period Great Britain became commercially supreme, developing not only the crown colony of Hong Kong but also joining France and Russia in extending her frontiers at the expense of the interior provinces of China and making "sphere of influence" agreements; France built up a Far Eastern empire in Indo-China; France and Great Britain pared down Siam; Russia took a maritime province from China, developed the port

of Vladivostok in former Chinese territory, and began to penetrate Manchuria; Germany got a lease on Shantung; and Japan intervened dramatically, fighting a successful war with China, to anticipate Russian designs on Korea.

When Russia and Japan were drifting rapidly to war, and when Great Britain and France had just taken additional territory from China in "compensation" for the German lease of Shantung, the United States suddenly found herself involved directly in the Far East by the capture of the Philippine Islands. At the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, had we decided to return the islands to Spain or to allow them to work out their own salvation (they were in insurrection against Spain at the time of the battle of Manila), there would have been no compelling reason for a change in our *laissez-faire* policy in the Far East. But because we decided to retain the Philippine Islands, we became involved in the Far Eastern Question. From the moment that Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States, the course of European intrigues in China became a vital interest of ours. We should have vigorously defended China against the ambitions of the European powers and Japan, or we should have joined them and shared in the loot. The latter alternative was repugnant to American ideals and traditions, and could not have

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been adopted and given the support of an electorate that was not even sure that the United States ought to retain the Philippine Islands. The former course was attempted in a half-hearted and round-about way by the formulation of the Open Door policy, of which we shall speak elsewhere.

In the year following the definite acquisition of the Philippine Islands, an opportunity presented itself to the United States to assert the independence of China and to defend the thesis aggressively and successfully. Anti-foreign outbreaks occurred, beginning with the murder of missionaries and reaching a climax in the beleaguering of the foreign legations at Peking. It was necessary to send an international expedition to relieve Peking; in this the United States joined. For the first time in our history American soldiers were engaged in military operations in a foreign country on another continent, and American troops have remained in China ever since, coöperating with those of the other powers in protecting the legations and in guarding the railway from Peking to the sea.

But this necessary departure from precedent did not lead us to insist upon a settlement, after the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion, that would have freed China, in some measure at least, from the fetters put upon her by the European powers and Japan, who would have partitioned China had

they been able to come to mutual agreement in regard to spheres of influence.

Just as we had mildly insisted upon the Open Door, we as mildly tried to protect China from the imposition of heavy indemnities. We gave a noble example of self-abnegation, reducing our claims to a fair valuation and refusing to make political capital out of having China at our mercy. But we failed to prevent the others from saddling China with huge indemnity liabilities, and we did not demand, as we should have done, a revision of the leasehold agreements and special concession grants that had been the principle causes of the Boxer outbreak.

Could we have done so? Against Europe and Japan united, no. Against the powers divided as they were, there is every probability that we should have succeeded in giving a different orientation to the international political situation in the Far East during the twentieth century. The leases of 1897, 1898, and 1899 were not as yet developed, and Japan and Russia had not come to blows. There had not been the enormous sacrifices and expenditure made by Japan in a successful war. Korea was still quasi-independent. Had we adopted European methods in the Peking Conferences, had we fought fire with fire, none can say that we should not have succeeded in preventing a further

stranglehold of the powers upon China, if not in actually prying them loose from some of the booty already in their possession.

The difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of pursuing any such policy would have been the hostility, through ignorance, of American public opinion to the adoption by our State Department of European tactics in a diplomatic battle with Europeans.

Ought we to have seized the post-Boxer opportunity of advancing our interests in the Far East? Most decidedly yes. There were two potent reasons for doing so: the commercial future and the strategic present. There was a third reason that clairvoyance would have realized: the rise of Japan in world power through the provocation afforded her by the continued extension of European eminent domain in her own part of the world.

Potentially China afforded the greatest foreign market to the United States and the most fruitful field for investment of our surplus capital. Unless the door was kept open, not by academic notes but by active diplomatic battling that could call force to its aid, American manufacturers and capitalists would in the course of time find themselves seriously handicapped by the exclusive political and economic privileges of the European powers and Japan in China. This would affect our prosperity.

Seeing that we had taken the Philippine Islands

"for better or for worse," it was manifestly our duty to view the political aggrandizement of the European powers and Japan in the Far East as a menace to our security. That no such menace has developed during the last twenty years is purely due to luck. Our foreign policy ought not to have taken the risk. We could never have defended the Philippine Islands against Japan alone after the war with Russia, or against any one of several combinations of European powers, with or without Japan as an ally. We might easily have become involved before or during the World War in a situation in which our honor would have been at stake and which would have compelled renewed naval building after the incurring of great losses—renewed naval building that would not have been finished now. We cannot too strongly emphasize in retrospect the fact that our foreign policy failed, for twenty years after the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, to handle the Far Eastern Question with any regard whatever for the defense of the Philippines in case of war.

We ought either to have refused to take the Philippines or, having taken them, to have changed radically our diplomacy in the Far East.

Not for criticism but in order that we may profit by the lesson, we can point out, and prove by illustrations, that our State Department has not fol-

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lowed in the Far East—and would not have been supported by public opinion had it tried to follow—the kind of policy that it was incumbent upon a country holding the Philippines to assert and to defend.

In 1899 and again in 1902 we outlined in notes to the powers our interest in maintaining the Open Door through preserving the integrity and independence of China. But in all the crises that arose during two decades we failed to stand behind the principle, and we never made good by acts the repeated assurances and encouragements given to China.

The most important of these crises can only be mentioned here. The reader is urged to study them for himself and to note how little comment the action of the executive and the State Department aroused at the time, with the single exception of the Shantung clauses in the Treaty of Versailles. And these, we suspect, aroused a storm, not on the merits of President Wilson's action as it affected our interest in the Far East, but for the ammunition furnished his political opponents.

In the period between the Boxer Rebellion and the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War we failed to protest against the acknowledgment of Japan's "special interests" in the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902. While that treaty was being negotiated

we made no diplomatic representations to Great Britain and Japan. The text of our treaty with Korea gave us the opportunity to intervene at that time. What was the situation? Japan and Russia were preparing for war. Actuated solely by her own interests elsewhere, Great Britain made up her mind to give Japan a free hand in the Far East and to sacrifice Korea. Why should we not have anticipated a future danger and a future crime? Lord Lansdowne hesitated a long time, and tried to hold out against Japanese insistence on the sacrifice of Korea by Great Britain. Had the United States energetically intervened, Japan might have been made to realize that a successful war with Russia would not be rewarded by winning Korea. It was important, of course, that the defense of Korea be undertaken at Petrograd as well as at London and Tokio. We let pass this opportunity of showing at the same time our idealism and protecting our interests in the Far East.

[This failure occurred again when the Russo-Japanese War broke out, and, later, when the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed. Had we declared at the outbreak of the war or during peace negotiations that we could not tolerate a Japanese protectorate over Korea or the continued infringement of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria by both Russia and Japan, the two nations would have

been forced to neutralize Korea. With public opinion in the Dominions sustaining a policy that was as much to their interest as to that of the United States, the British Foreign Office and a large section of British public opinion would have respected and approved a move on the part of the United States to save Korea and to preserve the Open Door in Manchuria.

Alas! nothing of the sort was done. To those who have studied the policy of the United States in the Far East from the Spanish-American War to the outbreak of the World War, the criticism and derision of President Wilson's notes to the European powers on the part of former President Roosevelt's admirers make strange reading. Without the intention of detracting from Mr. Roosevelt's reputation for "red blood" and energy, it must be pointed out that the State Department acted in the Far East during Mr. Roosevelt's administration as it did in Europe before we broke off diplomatic relations with Germany. In both cases the fault does not lie with our Presidents, but with the indifference and supineness of the American people in every question involving our relations with the rest of the world. The policy of allowing the European powers to mold the destinies of the Far East, if it was ever justifiable, ought to have been

abandoned after the acquisition of the Philippines and the miraculous development of our own Pacific coast States. Opportunities to strike out boldly and assert ourselves were neglected by the Roosevelt administration. We allowed Great Britain to be the real mediator between Japan and Russia, contenting ourselves with the hollow glory of having made the peace. We won the resentment of the Japanese without having earned it, and we received no thanks from the Russians.

This was evident from the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. Our remonstrances concerning the activities of Japan in Liao-tung peninsula and Korea and our notes on the Manchurian railways were ignored. The United States was frozen out of the only part of Asia that really mattered to us.

In 1910, in Mr. Taft's administration, Japan annexed Korea. The clear wording of our treaty with Korea gave us the right to refuse to recognize this act of highway robbery. More than that, when the emperor of Korea appealed to us, we could have invoked the treaty, and we could have intervened to protect the independence of Korea, with as much right as Great Britain intervened to defend Belgium in 1914. Why did we not do so? Were our statesmen and were the American people

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less open to committing the nation to an action on moral grounds than were the British statesmen and the British people four years later?

It is excellent discipline and right thinking to study national behavior dispassionately. When we do, we are better able to realize that national policies are the expression of self-interest and not of idealism. We did not bother our heads about what happened to Korea because Japan was not menacing the security of the United States; and the action she took did not seem to interfere with American prosperity. It is not enough for statesmen to have a vision of the future interests of their country. The people must see for themselves. They must be alive to the consequences of the activities of other nations. In 1914 the geographical position of Belgium was what mattered, not her treaty rights. The German invasion appeared to the British Government and people as a direct menace to the security and prosperity of Great Britain.

Where we have failed in the Far East is in not appreciating the importance of a free China to our commerce. We have sentimentalized about the Chinese, victims of European and Japanese aggression. But that is as far as it has gone. We have been unwilling to demand and support as a nation a vigorous foreign policy in the Far East, undertaken for China's sake. But if public opin-

ion were educated to understand that a strong and healthy China, standing on her own feet, a China in which no foreign nations had spheres of influence or special privileges, meant security and prosperity for the United States, we should gladly do for our own sake what we would never do for China's sake. We should not limit our protests against European and Japanese encroachment to the sending of notes.

CHAPTER VIII

THE PANAMA CANAL

AMERICANS who are old enough to remember the war with Spain have no trouble in recalling vividly the anxiety that was universally manifested before Cervera's fleet was bottled up in Santiago Harbor. We faced the unknown. None could tell where the Spanish war-vessels were going to appear, and it was believed that all the battle-ships we could muster would not be more than were needed to meet the Spaniards in open battle. An essential unit, the *Oregon*, was on the Pacific coast. Summoned to reinforce the Atlantic fleet, the *Oregon* had to steam ten thousand miles. This experience, coupled with the fact that the acquisition of the Philippines and Hawaii brought us face to face with new problems in the Pacific, opened the eyes of the American people to the necessity of an Atlantic-Pacific canal. Considerations of prosperity alone had not been able to induce Congress to adopt a canal policy. When our security was threatened the question became acute and had to be settled quickly.

Projects for isthmian transit had been before the country for three generations. Within four years after the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine the United States had been invited by the infant Republic of Central America to join in constructing a canal. Not only was the offer refused, but a concession secured from Nicaragua by a Dutch concern for building a canal, coupled with a monopoly of the coast trade, was opposed by the United States as an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine. In 1835 the Senate decided that a canal should be constructed at Nicaragua. Immediately there arose the question of Panama as a better location. The American representative, assuming the responsibility of deciding upon Panama, was repudiated by the State Department, Congress insisting upon the Nicaragua route. Great Britain blocked this scheme. The project was held in abeyance for years.

After the war with Mexico a Mexican route was considered feasible for a time, but the ill will of Mexico frustrated this plan. In 1848 the United States concluded a treaty with the Republic of New Granada (which afterward became Colombia) for exclusive transit across the Isthmus of Panama, which resulted in the building of the Panama Railway. Engineers earnestly advocated the Nicaragua route, and negotiations were entered

into once more with Nicaragua. British opposition again blocked the plan. Although a treaty was actually signed with Nicaragua, it was not ratified by the Senate; for it was plain that a determined effort to push the Nicaragua canal through would involve the United States in serious diplomatic difficulties with Great Britain. The slavery issue was looming at the time. A foreign war would have been suicidal. The British Government was quick to take advantage of our internal political situation.

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, signed on April 19, 1850, and rushed through the Senate, was a British diplomatic victory whose results were far-reaching. It is evident that Secretary Clayton thought that by binding the United States never to obtain or exercise exclusive control over the proposed canal nor to build fortifications along its route he was securing from Great Britain the waiver of any claims to sovereignty upon the Mosquito Coast. But the British stoutly affirmed that the renunciation did not apply to the British foothold at Honduras; the text of the treaty was obscure. A controversy arose immediately over the extent of the "dependencies" of British Honduras, Nicaragua appealing to the United States to act under the Monroe Doctrine against British encroachments. The conflict involved several of the Central American republics,

and effectually prevented any progress toward canal construction.

Then came the Civil War, followed by the era of railway expansion across the continent. The railway companies naturally regarded a ship-canal as a competitor for freights that would make trans-continental railways unprofitable. The development of steam-vessels also shortened the time required to "round the cape." To America, bound by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty to grant Great Britain participation in the construction and maintenance of the canal, the proposition did not look as attractive as it had been when the question was first discussed. Half a century was lost.

Shortly before the Civil War, France became interested in an Atlantic-Pacific canal. The successful completion of the Suez Canal greatly helped the French. Despite strenuous protest on the part of the United States, a French company began work at Panama in February, 1881. De Lesseps and his associates failed to solve the engineering difficulties of cutting through Panama and became involved in a financial scandal that ended in bankrupting the French company.

In the meantime, American diplomats tried for fifteen years to overcome the handicaps of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by reviving the Nicaragua project. No progress was made until after the

Spanish-American War, when the secretary of state, John Hay, succeeded in negotiating with the British Government a modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, submitted to the Senate in 1900, provided for the construction and operation of a Panama canal by the United States. But the United States was to agree to the neutralization of the canal, to undertake not to blockade or fortify it, and to guarantee equality in tolls and conditions of passage to all nations.

These concessions met with vehement opposition, and the treaty was ratified only after amendments had been inserted rejecting the prohibition of fortifications and the joint guarantee by other powers of the canal's neutrality. Great Britain refused to accept the amendments. The following year, however, the British Government was induced to consent to the fortification of the canal and to admit the right of blockade, insisting only upon equality of tolls and of conditions of passage. In addition, Great Britain agreed that the modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty should apply to a Nicaragua canal as well as to one at Panama, while the long outstanding conflict over British rights on the Caribbean mainland was settled by a definite limitation of British "rights" to British Honduras.

As far as Great Britain and other European nations were concerned the way was now open for the

construction of an American canal under American control. But we had still to decide which of the two routes we should adopt and to adjust the problem of American control with the sovereign rights of the country through whose territory the canal was to be built. The Panama route was the shorter one, and it was felt that attention to sanitation and direct government financing would overcome the difficulties that had proved insurmountable in the case of the French company. But the French bondholders held out for a sum far in excess of what the United States was willing to pay. They agreed to American terms only when they realized that otherwise the Nicaragua route would be chosen, thus making their investment a total loss.

At the beginning of 1902 Congress reversed its choice of Nicaragua and authorized the President to purchase the French company's franchise for forty million dollars (which was to include the work already done and the materials and equipment on hand), and to complete the Panama canal. But the resolution left open the alternate route in case a satisfactory treaty could not be made with Colombia.

But now that the preference for Panama had been expressed, the Colombian Government, supposedly under the influence of Germany, refused to consent to the transfer of the franchise from the

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French company to the United States Government and to the granting of a lease to the United States in return for a substantial cash payment and a perpetual annuity. Colombia contended that the old franchise was not transferable and that she was free to give a new franchise to a German company or any other concern that might outbid the United States. The United States had not objected to the original grant of a franchise to a European country. Had not a precedent been created that could not now be ignored by invoking the Monroe Doctrine?

The question was as serious as it was delicate. It would have been possible for the United States to contend that the Monroe Doctrine while not forbidding a concession to private European interests, did mean that interests acquired by one European power could not be transferred to another European power but only to the United States or some other American country. It was realized, however, that the principle of Colombian sovereignty was at stake; for the Monroe Doctrine had never been enforced, in the interest of the United States, against the wishes or interests of a Latin American country, but only when it seemed necessary to protect the sovereignty and interest of an American country against a European power.

A dramatic solution of the problem was found. The people of Panama rebelled against Colombia

and proclaimed themselves an independent republic. There is no doubt that the revolution was engineered by emissaries of the French company, who saw that the chance of recovering any portion of their money was disappearing before the stubbornness and ill will of Colombia. The French could not afford to stand by and see the United States construct a canal through Nicaragua, nor could they allow the negotiations to be prolonged by interminable bickering and delay until the period of their franchise had expired.

In the autumn of 1903, when the Colombian Government took military measures to put down the insurrection, the United States, acting under the treaty of 1846, which gave us the right to prevent the interruption of traffic across the isthmus, interfered with the movement of Colombian troops on the Panama Railway. This action, together with the prevention by the American navy of the landing of Government troops at Panama or Colón, enabled the insurrectionists to form a cabinet and to exercise effective control on the isthmus without hindrance. The Republic of Panama was proclaimed on November 3, 1903, and, contrary to our time-honored precedent of making haste slowly when it came to the recognition of revolutionary governments, the United States accorded full recognition to the new republic four days later!

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Seeing that the day was lost and that the United States intended to treat directly with the men whom she had so powerfully helped to put into power at Panama, Colombia offered to ratify the canal treaty which she had rejected, and to accept terms less favorable than those we had been willing to agree to in our long and tedious negotiations with the recalcitrant politicians at Bogotá. But the United States refused either to aid in undoing the revolution or to allow Colombia to fight Panama. We ignored the offer of Colombia to refer the dispute to the Hague Tribunal. The only settlement the United States would consider was a cash payment as "indemnity," in return for which Colombia should give us a quit-claim deed by recognizing the new republic and waiving for all time political and financial interests in the isthmus. The dispute with Colombia was settled only after twenty years by the payment of a lump sum of twenty-five million dollars. Because this settlement might be regarded as a reflection upon President Roosevelt, many Americans were opposed to it to the bitter end.

The ethics of our part in the Panama revolution has long been debated, and it is probable that a unanimous verdict will never be rendered. Congress defeated several proposals to indemnify Colombia on the ground that they implied a confession of our guilt. Had we treated Colombia, a small

nation, fairly? Was the Panama insurrection engineered by interested parties in connivance with high officials of the United States?

No positive answer can be given to the first of these questions. Colombia had never acted in good faith, and when the canal became a necessity there was certain to be a limit to forbearance. It seemed impossible to arrive at an understanding with Colombia; and the prompt recognition of the new republic by European powers indicated their belief that what had occurred was of world interest and did not mean simply an advantage to the United States. World-wide commercial interests had long demanded the construction of the canal. The United States Government was the only agency that could construct it. An Atlantic-Pacific canal was as important and as advantageous to the Latin American states, including Colombia, as it was important and advantageous to the United States.

There are men still living who could answer the second question. But they have not yet published their memoirs. There is only circumstantial evidence. M. Bunau-Varilla, a Frenchman and an agent of the canal company, was appointed Panamanian minister to the United States; it was he who negotiated and signed the canal treaty with Secretary Hay. The French engineer and financier had no interest in the company for which he was acting.

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His sole anxiety was to get something out of the wreck for the French bondholders. For years he had been lobbying at Washington against the choice of the Nicaragua route. In the critical days of the coup d'état he was in constant communication both with the revolutionists and the American State Department. Presto, he became envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of a new state!

At the best, the historian must record the whole affair as an illustration of *Realpolitik*, of which the explanation is that the end was regarded as the justification of the means.

The treaty with the Republic of Panama gave the United States a free hand in constructing and controlling the Panama Canal. Panama granted a perpetual lease of a canal zone ten miles wide, with islands in the Bay of Panama, and recognized the right of the United States to intervene when necessary to preserve order in Panama. The provisions for administrative control made the Canal Zone virtually American territory. The Panama Railway became the property of the American Government. The practical result of the treaty was to make the new republic an American protectorate; and it was immediately recognized that this could never have been satisfactorily done had Panama remained a province of Colombia. In return we

guaranteed the independence of Panama and undertook to pay to the new republic the cash bonus and perpetual annuity that we had been willing to give Colombia.

It took ten years to build the canal, which was opened just after the beginning of the World War. During the first two and a half years there were several land-slides; but since the beginning of 1917 the channel has been maintained at full depth, and there has been no interruption of traffic. In the first eight years of operation tonnage and tolls tripled. In the near future a second canal will have to be opened to keep pace with the needs of world commerce and national defense. Plans have already been formulated for the Nicaragua Canal.

The cities of Panama and Colón are under the authority of the republic, but the United States exercises sanitation and quarantine jurisdiction in both these cities and in their harbors; and the wharves and roadsteads are in the American zone. The Canal Zone is a United States military reservation, without private landowners, and is inhabited only by canal and railway employees and their families. The native inhabitants of the Zone are tenants of the United States and live under military rule. The canal can be traversed in five hours, and thirty-six ships can be put through in a day.

Aside from the unfortunate situation created with

Colombia, there has never been any question or dispute with other American countries resulting from the construction and control of the canal by the United States. It is certain that the construction of the Nicaragua Canal will be accompanied by none of the difficulties of the earlier undertaking. To all the peoples of the American continent—to the whole world, for that matter—the control of Atlantic-Pacific traffic by the United States has now become an accepted fact. Moreover, the enterprise has become self-supporting.

But the Panama Canal has involved the United States in international economic and political questions in a way that was not foreseen. The rise and discussion of these questions, following the long struggle to put through the Canal, have proved a valuable lesson in world politics to the American people.

Lesson? I should say lessons; for we have learned something, and have much yet to learn, about international affairs through our ownership of one of the world's most important waterways.

1. *We have learned the folly of concluding treaties with European powers which do not contain reciprocal concessions that can be used for bargaining.* The fatal defect of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was that it bound this country to grant certain privileges to other countries in isthmian transit

in the Western Hemisphere without exacting reciprocal privileges in case similar enterprises should be undertaken by other countries in other parts of the world. There is no reason why we should ever have bound ourselves by treaty to grant equality of treatment in tolls and conditions of passage in a waterway constructed and maintained by us without stipulating either (a) that a sea voyage beginning and ending at a home port should be exempt from the equality provision or (b) that in the case of any canal constructed or waterway control between international bodies of water in any other part of the world the constructing and controlling country should bind itself to the same stipulation. Had we done this, the dispute with Great Britain over Panama tolls would never have arisen. Great Britain would be the last country in the world to sign in advance a blank check such as we signed to prevent government assistance to commerce. In the Clayton-Bulwer and Hay-Pauncefote treaties we gave something for nothing; we assumed an obligation without exacting reciprocity; and we put ourselves in a hole by failing to have some concession or undertaking that we could use for bargaining purposes with the other contracting party.

2. We have learned that other nations are unwilling to yield in the interpretation of treaties, if sticking to the text and ignoring the spirit is to their

advantage. A striking recent example of this was the refusal of the British Government to waive the three-mile limit in the case of vessels engaged in rum-running off our coast, even though our laws were being broken by their activities, until pressure was brought to bear upon London by Dominion premiers; and even then we had to offer concessions to the British to get concessions from them. The plea that conditions had changed, through the development of high-powered motor-boats, since the three-mile limit was established, did not move the literalists of the British Foreign Office.

But whenever it has suited its purpose the British Government, by Orders in Council, has unilaterally abrogated or modified maritime law; but it has stubbornly contested the right of other nations to do so. When Congress provided for a reduction of tolls for American vessels engaged in Atlantic-Pacific coastal trade, the British Government protested, invoking the text of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. It is probable that the American State Department did not dream of Great Britain's including our coastal trade in the provisions for equality of tolls and conditions of passage in the canal treaty. It could be reasonably argued that lower tolls and priority in passage for vessels plying between the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the United States involved no discrimination or denial of

equality of treatment for the simple reason that only vessels of American registry could carry freight and passengers between American ports. But how did the text read? The British stood on the literal interpretation of the treaty, not because this was their right in order to assure equality of treatment for their vessels, but because they saw the opportunity to use the treaty to prevent our encouragement of the American merchant marine by any indirect form of subsidy.

3. *We have learned that the claims of other nations against us must be acknowledged and met, even if unfair.* Colombia treated us shabbily, tried to blackmail us and then to sell us out, and had only herself to blame for what happened in Panama. And yet, because there was question of our good faith in the Panama revolution, we were willing to indemnify Colombia for losses incurred by her own fault. Similarly although it would seem that no treaty with another nation should be allowed to interfere with the regulation of our internal shipping, we repealed the Panama Canal Act and thus admitted the validity of the British contention that equality of treatment included also our coastal trade.

4. *We have learned that in world politics opportunities missed do not easily return.* Beginning with February, 1917, there were two precious years

during which the American Government could have secured without effort a modification of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty that would have covered the tolls dispute and settled it for all time, and when we could have gained international agreement to the permanent neutralization of the West Indies and the Caribbean in so far as European powers were concerned. But during this period our diplomacy in relation to the Panama Canal was as inactive as our engineering forces were active. We solved the problem of land-slides; we ignored the greater problem of securing recognition as master in our own house. It would have been so easy! And to those who indignantly cry out that diplomatic understandings to safeguard our national interests would have been shameful at a time when the world was afire, we answer that the Entente Powers never missed an opportunity throughout the war of wringing from one another all kinds of concessions and advantages.

Of course many earnest Americans think that the United States should set the example in international morality, and that we have nothing to regret when we act on a high plane in our dealings with other nations. And none agrees with this contention more heartily than the writer. But it is not enough to refrain from wronging others. We must insist that others do not wrong us. When we get

into difficulties like those of the canal treaties, other nations do not give us credit for disinterestedness. They only marvel at our ineptitude in world politics which makes it so easy for them to take advantage of us. We actually put temptation in their way!

5. *We have learned that the Panama Canal has become of vital importance and that it affects both our security and our prosperity, which means that we must shape our foreign policy to defend the existing canal and the future one that we shall build to supplement it.* When my last child was born a wise man said to me, "You probably would n't have paid anything for another baby, but now that you have it, you would n't take a million dollars for it." Is it not like that with the Panama Canal, which has become an integral part of the United States? We don't know how we ever got along without it. If the vital means of communication we have become accustomed to count upon were interrupted, we should feel insecure, and the commercial effects would be disastrous. Hence, from the day the canal was opened, it was incumbent upon the American Government to build up a system of defense for the canal and to consider seriously every possible menace. The canal is a precious artery for our coastal trade. On the canal depends our ability to furnish adequate protection to the Pacific coast States, to maintain our ascendancy in the New

World, and to hold Hawaii and the Philippines. It is not enough that the Canal Zone itself is fortified. We must think of every possible contingency that might arise along the sea-paths to the canal that have now become virtually an essential extension of our internal waterways.

CHAPTER IX

THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF THE OPEN DOOR

IN the early days of the republic the American Government was alive to the necessity of insisting that European nations pursue no policy tending to discriminate against American interests throughout the world. For half a century it was a necessity. The prosperity of the United States largely depended upon free and unhampered intercourse with the rest of the world. The vast resources of the interior of the American continent were undeveloped. There were no railways. The population was not increasing rapidly by immigration. The time when internal consumption was more than to keep pace with rapidly increasing production had not yet arrived. Coal and steam power had not yet become revolutionary factors in economic life. Americans were sailors par excellence, and every condition was favorable to Yankee preëminence in the carrying-trade. Our commercial activities were pushed successfully to the ends of the earth.

It was natural, then, that our chief preoccupation

should be the freedom of the seas and equal opportunities for American shipping in foreign ports. Public opinion backed the State Department in demanding respect for the American flag, in defending and advancing the interests of our merchant marine, and in keeping pace with European nations in making treaties with Asiatic and African peoples. The Mediterranean littoral, the Near East, and the Far East received our whole-hearted attention. We were ready to fight the Barbary pirates, to negotiate treaties and trade agreements with Turkey and Russia, to watch the growth of Egypt, and to be as enterprising as European nations in dealings with African tribes, Persia, Siam, and China. We initiated the movement to open Japan to world trade, and we were among the first to knock at the doors of Korea.

Striking illustrations of the fact that our grandfathers and great-grandfathers attached vital importance to the world-wide character of American interests is to be found in our activities in China and Japan during the twenty years preceding the Civil War.

When Great Britain started European intervention in the Far East by waging a war with China over opium, Commodore Kearny was present off Hong Kong with a naval squadron. His instructions were to see that the war should not result in

giving Great Britain a preferred position in trade with China. In the autumn of 1842 Commodore Kearny received from Chinese commissioners explicit assurances that whatever concessions were made to Great Britain would be granted also to the United States.

Caleb Cushing was sent to China to negotiate a treaty. In his instructions from President Tyler is to be found one terse sentence that epitomizes the Open Door policy of which the United States has been the consistent champion for eighty years; the President said, "Let there be no unfair advantage on either side."

The treaty with China, signed at Macao on July 3, 1843, stipulated that the contracting parties bound themselves to grant each other "most favored nation" privileges in trade; and China promised that the United States should enjoy all the privileges and concessions embodied in any treaties that China might make with any other nation. The spirit of the treaty was well expressed in a letter from Mr. Cushing to Secretary Webster: "Whatever progress either Government [meaning Great Britain and the United States] makes in opening this vast empire to the influence of foreign commerce is for the common good of each other and of all Christendom."

Two years later Congress passed a resolution

urging the President to attempt to make commercial treaties with Japan and Korea. After two unsuccessful attempts to break through the seclusion of centuries, Commodore Perry was intrusted with the task of negotiating a treaty with Japan. In 1853 Perry succeeded in establishing communications with the Japanese Government. The next year he returned with ten war-vessels. The first Japanese commercial treaty was signed on March 31, 1854. It provided for the opening of several ports, and for the enjoyment by the United States of all the privileges and concessions that might subsequently be granted to other nations. The American initiative was followed by Great Britain, Russia, Holland, and France. In 1863 the crisis of the Civil War did not prevent the United States from participating with Great Britain, Holland, and France in a naval demonstration to compel Japan to continue along the path of intercourse with the rest of the world upon which she had unwittingly entered.

A simple list of commercial treaties, all of them containing insistence on equal rights for American commerce, is sufficient to prove the great and widespread interest of our forefathers in the principle of the Open Door generations before it was known by that name. The following treaties can be cited: Algiers, 1795; Tunis, 1797 and 1824; Tripoli,

1796 and 1805; Morocco, 1787 and 1836; Ottoman Empire, 1830; Greece, 1837; Siam, 1833 and 1856; Muscat (whose sultan ruled from the Persian Gulf to Zanzibar), 1833; Persia, 1856; Borneo, 1850; Luchu, 1854; China, 1844 and 1858; Japan, 1854, 1857, and 1858; Hawaiian Islands, 1849; Liberia, 1862; and Madagascar, 1867.

It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the foundation for an aggressive American foreign policy, claiming and successfully maintaining the rights of the United States to the Open Door, was well laid by example as well as precept during the first two generations of our existence as an independent nation. Unfortunately the period of intensive internal development of the United States coincided with the period of overseas expansion of Europe in Asia and Africa. Absorbed in our own affairs, we lost sight of the great world for half a century simply because we no longer felt the need of asserting ourselves. Our carrying-trade ceased to be important to us. Foreign markets played no part in our prosperity. In the twentieth century we had to return as new-comers into the field of world affairs, and we were confronted with barriers and entrenched positions made while we had been thinking only of ourselves and business at home.

The British flag and British influence reached all corners of the globe through centuries of tireless

exploration, trading, fighting, and colonizing. Extension of political sovereignty was not infrequently accidental. In this way long before 1850 Great Britain had been building her world-wide empire. Ancient French titles survived the disasters of the First Empire in several regions, and France had begun to penetrate Africa from the Mediterranean coast in the fourth decade of the nineteenth century. Russia's activities in Siberia dated from the early days of the Romanoffs. The American colonies were just being settled and Petrograd had not yet been founded when Moscow began making treaties with China over Mongolia. Spain, Portugal, and Holland retained colonies won in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

But the last half of the nineteenth century, despite four hundred years of extra-European activities of European nations, was the great era of European expansion.

Great Britain consolidated her empire in India, advanced into Burma, extended her control over the Malay peninsula and adjacent islands from Singapore, achieved a remarkable foothold in China, established the validity of explorers' claims in the South Pacific, developed New Zealand and Australia, and became a predominant European power in Africa from the Cape of Good Hope to Cairo.

The vast colonial empire of France and the penetration of Russia across Asia to Vladivostok took place during this period. Not until after our Civil War did Germany and Italy enter the colonial field, and Japan became a factor in world politics only a few years before we acquired the Philippines.

The urge of European economic materialism, exploring and developing Africa, preying on the Ottoman Empire, undermining the ancient civilization of China, and provoking Japan to imitate Europe's example in sheer self-defense, is comparatively recent history.

The war with Spain in 1898 brought the United States out of her self-absorption of two generations, and involved us in the hitherto purely European task of "bearing the white man's burden." But if it had not been the war with Spain, it would have been something else; for the psychological moment had come to face the problem of our place in the world.

Our country was beginning to be pretty well settled and furnished with internal means of communication. Immigrants were flocking to the United States every year by the hundreds of thousands. Economic conditions were growing similar to those of European countries. Young men had gone West until the West was populated. Money

was no longer at a big premium for internal development. We could not count indefinitely upon the phenomenon of constant excess of consumers over producers that had kept us for so long indifferent to the outside world. Never before had we had to think of overseas investment for surplus capital and of overseas markets for surplus farm products and manufactured goods; with the first surplus of capital and the first suggestion of producing power in excess of consuming capacity, we began to look beyond our own doors.

Press and pulpit and politicians had it that we were awakening to the sense of responsibility toward the rest of the world. We had a sacred trust to perform. As a matter of fact, the change in our relations with the outside world was due to the necessity of finding an answer to two questions: investments abroad, how were they to be assured? foreign markets, how were they to be secured?

It was natural that the Open Door should once more become an important principle of American foreign policy. Things do not just happen! It was a coincidence that possession of the Philippines gave us a political and strategic interest in the Far East. Even if we had not fought the war with Spain, the time had come for justifiable apprehension over the likely culmination of European intrigues in the Far East. [The European powers

seemed to be working for the partition of China. They were making "sphere of influence" agreements, compromising rival ambitions, with the inevitable result that the United States would find herself in a position of inferiority in the struggle for Far Eastern trade.

It is with this background that we must study Dewey's expedition to Manila, the decision to keep the Philippines, and Secretary Hay's note to the European powers and Japan on the Open Door in China. Germany had just taken Kiau-Chau; Russia, Port Arthur; Great Britain, Weihaiwei; and France, Kuang-Chau. Great Britain and Russia answered the entry of the United States into the Far East by agreeing to divide the commercial and industrial interests of the Chinese Empire, while the other powers vied with Great Britain and Russia at Peking to extend their leased territory and to secure exclusive concessions in the parts of the empire of which they had appointed themselves trustees.

The Open Door policy of the United States was formally announced by Secretary Hay in notes to Great Britain, Russia, and Germany, which were later duplicated to France, Italy, and Japan, announcing that the United States did not consider as valid claims to "spheres of influence" that discriminated against American trade and capital.

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He asked the powers to assent to the American interpretation of Chinese sovereignty and of China's treaties of commerce, which did not tolerate the suppression of treaty-ports or the vested interests of any power in treaty-ports. The United States proposed that the six powers unite with her in promising to respect the Chinese tariff, administered by Chinese officials, and to join in insisting that there be no discrimination against one nation in favor of another in port dues or railway rates. When the powers answered that they were in accord in principle, Secretary Hay announced that the United States considered their acceptance of the Open Door note as final and definitive.

But the Boxer Rebellion, which involved the siege of Peking and was complicated by assassination of foreigners, including that of the German minister by a soldier in uniform, led to an international expedition for the relief of the foreign colonies gathered as refugees in the legations. In announcing this first participation of American troops in an international army, Mr. Hay was careful to notify the powers that we understood the sole purpose of the expedition to be the protection of the lives and property of foreigners and the restoration of order. Whatever the means that would have to be employed in putting down anarchy, "the policy of the

Government of the United States," declared Mr. Hay, "is to seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace to China, to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly Powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire."

Great Britain and Germany answered that Mr. Hay's statement set forth their own policy as well as that of the United States. The other powers were silent. Later Great Britain and Germany signed an agreement pledging themselves not to take advantage of existing conditions, to act together to prevent any other power from securing special advantages that would impair existing interests, and to preserve the territorial integrity of China. We did not commit ourselves on the point of "the protection of existing interests." The other powers with the exception of France and Russia accepted the Anglo-German agreement.

In the treaty discussions that followed, the American minister at Peking was instructed to oppose heavy indemnities; he was able to defeat schemes that would have resulted in the total infeudation of China to Europe, if not actual partition.

It is impossible to enter into the long and complicated story of two decades of unsuccessful effort

on the part of the United States to get the other powers to make their Far Eastern diplomatic activities conform with the Open Door policy. The alternatives before us were: (a) protecting China by force; or (b) entering into special diplomatic understandings with the other powers for dividing the loot or for consenting to the robbery of China in return for compensations elsewhere. The first alternative is an impossible one; and the second was repugnant to us. We continued to send notes and protests, but the door has not remained open in China. On the contrary, it has been slammed shut in our face in rich portions of Chinese territory. Mr. Hay had continual trouble with Russia over Manchuria. But it was Japan and not the United States that fought Russia to check her continued encroachments on Chinese sovereignty. Both Russia and Japan, however, having agreed to divide Manchuria, ignored the Open Door principle. In 1908 Secretary Root and in 1909 Secretary Knox remonstrated without success against Russian interference with American trade and discrimination against American commerce in northern Manchuria. Russia and Japan in January, 1910, rejected Secretary Knox's proposals for the return of the Manchurian railways to China. Great Britain, France, and Germany, each enjoying their own special privileges, were non-committal. In the same year

Japan annexed Korea; another door was shut.

During the World War Japan attempted to close still further the door to American trade in China. With singular ineptitude the Wilson administration failed to take advantage of our unique position during the World War to force the European powers and Japan to bind themselves to waive Boxer indemnities, surrender leases, and make a solemn compact tending to the abolition of all special privileges of foreign nations in China. Mr. Wilson went so far as to have Secretary Lansing recognize Japan's special interest in China and to agree to the transfer of the Kiau-Chau and Shantung concessions from Germany to Japan in the Treaty of Versailles. By the time the Washington Conference assembled at the end of 1921 our unique chance of restoring China's full sovereignty and of guaranteeing that the door remain genuinely open had passed. The result is that we shall have to struggle aggressively for equal rights in trade and equal opportunities for concessions in what we are coming to recognize more and more to be a rich and logical overseas field for American capital and goods.

As concrete illustrations, we have the protests and warnings of American chambers of commerce in the Far East, who complain that British and other European financial interests are devoting

feverish energy to the task of penetrating China and that they are obtaining every possible commercial advantage from the strongly intrenched political positions their respective countries have built in recent years for this very purpose—and against the will of the United States. A specific instance is the cancellation by the Chinese Government of the contract with the Federal Telegraph Company for the erection of radio stations. The cancellation was due to pressure brought by the British Government upon China on the ground that the contract with the American concern was a violation of the monopoly enjoyed by the Marconi company, a British organization. One could fill pages with cases of this kind, all of them of the post-bellum period. European diplomacy is working to prevent the Open Door in China, and is determined that John Hay's declaration of American policy shall not be taken seriously in the Far East.

But is there anywhere else in Asia or Africa where American trade and capital can be said to enjoy the Open Door? Everywhere American bankers, steamship and cable companies, oil and mining interests, and merchants find the same thing. We suffer from the handicap that Italy and Germany have suffered from, the lack of colonies and footholds, of protectorates and spheres of influence,

in which our foreign investments and trade have special privileges or which we can use for bargaining purposes to enforce reciprocity.

Up to the present time, as has been pointed out, the United States was too busy at home to bother with interests abroad, and, because our foreign interests were negligible and not necessary to the nation's prosperity, doors could be slammed shut so far as we cared. Occasionally, as in China, we made a protest; but the issue was not worth shaking the saber about. The European nations, more dependent on overseas markets, felt differently. The statement is not too strong that conflicts over trade interests, compromised and not compromised, made inevitable the World War. Had the American doctrine of the Open Door been applied throughout Africa and Asia by the European powers among themselves, there would have been no war in 1914.

Thoughtful Americans are inclined to agree that it was contrary to our own interests and to those of Occidental civilization for us to attempt to upset the status existing in 1914. It was good policy to accept all that had happened and that we had not tried to prevent. Knocking on closed doors with sword in hand would only have brought trouble to us as it did to Germany. But when in our economic evolution our own interests demanded that doors

still open or partly open be not shut in our face, there was ample justification for the use of our influence and strength to back the Open Door policy just as whole-heartedly as we backed the Monroe Doctrine.

After the World War the time had come to assert ourselves. Unfortunately this fact was only imperfectly realized during the Peace Conference. Since the Conference, however, the State Department has not let pass a single occasion to protest against the more flagrant violations of the Open Door principle. Successive secretaries of state have sent sharp and vigorous notes to our former comrades in arms. But until the European powers realize that American public opinion is behind the State Department official protests of our Government will have little effect.

The World War did not change or even modify the fundamental concept of European diplomacy which guided, to the exclusion of other considerations, the intercourse of European nations among themselves and with the peoples of Africa and Asia. This guiding concept was that a nation's diplomacy, backed by armed force, should seek exclusive privileges or at least preferential treatment for its nationals in as many and as wide areas as possible. To accomplish this purpose it was held justifiable to deprive an African or Asiatic people of its liberty

and keep it in subjection to a European nation or dependent upon it. Political overlordship was gained and maintained by force of arms. It was considered right for each European nation to prevent rival European powers from extending their influence by similar methods for the same ends. Where rivalries could be adjusted by compromise and bargaining, war was avoided.

The World War was supposed to have been fought to change this concept, to replace it by a new idea of international relations. The weak were to be protected from the strong, and all peoples were to have equal opportunities for free and peaceful development in a world where the League of Nations would settle differences that might arise. But we see no constructive effort on the part of any European statesman or nation to enlist his country in the attainment of this ideal. On the contrary, the victorious powers, having eliminated Germany and Russia, sought a redistribution of African and Asiatic spheres of influence on the old basis; they took us at our word as wanting nothing and seeking nothing.

Overwhelming proofs of this statement are to be found in the Open Door notes sent out from our State Department since August, 1919. It is gratifying to observe that in defending the Open Door policy, as in defending the Monroe Doctrine, party

lines have not existed. Just as the Wilson administration took up the policy from the Roosevelt and Taft administrations, the Harding and Coolidge administrations have kept up the work of the Wilson administration.

We protested against the British protectorate over Persia; against a British monopoly of oil interests in Mesopotamia; against the decision of the San Remo Conference to partition most of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence among Great Britain, France, and Italy; against the discrimination affecting American companies in oil concessions in the Dutch East Indies; against the intention of Japan and France in Siberia and Manchuria and of Great Britain in the Caucasus and northern Persia to liquidate Russian interests for their exclusive benefit; against British and Australian violation of the mandate terms agreed upon for the island of Nauru and similar Japanese violations of mandate obligations in Pacific islands, notably Yap; against various cable and wireless monopolies in the Far East and Pacific; against the exclusion of the United States in the distribution of Germany's confiscated cables; against the failure to give us our share of the sums collected from Germany for the upkeep of the armies of occupation; and against France's announced intention of setting aside the

Open Door stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles in regard to Morocco.

In addition to official protests of the American Government, charges have been preferred against all the Entente powers by American chambers of commerce in the Near East and Far East; and our Shipping Board has been in controversy with the British Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria, which used unfair methods to prevent American ships from getting the contract to carry cotton bought with American money for American markets.

Many Americans, on the ground of idealism, have sympathized with small nations struggling to obtain their freedom or to retain it, but there is no case on record, except where the Monroe Doctrine prevails, in which the United States has intervened in favor of a small nation against a European power. We have watched with indifference the extinction of national independence and successive encroachments upon the territory and sovereignty of many small countries. We have accepted changes of political status as *faits accomplis*. In some of these instances American treaty rights were affected. The list is long: China, Korea, Indo-Chinese states, Siam, Burma, Federated Malay States, Empire of Muscat, Ottoman Empire, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, Madagascar, Congo Free

State, South African republics—the list might be extended to most of the countries beyond the limits of the Monroe Doctrine that are to be found in a postage-stamp album.

But now that our productive activities give us a surplus of capital to invest and a surplus of food and goods to sell abroad, we may be able to realize that protection of small nations from European rapacity means very much—and will mean more as years go by—in connection with the general problem of American prosperity. The Entente Powers were interested in self-determination only as a means of disrupting the alliance of their enemies and depriving them of strength and economic advantages in the world after the war. They never intended that it should be applied to themselves. We Americans were more genuinely interested in it. But idealism has a tendency to limit itself to words and to find adequate expression in phrases and the formulation of principles. Is not the time here, however, when we may coldly consider the protection of small nations and the encouragement of the principle of self-determination as our most powerful weapon in securing the opening of doors that are shut and in keeping open the few that do remain open? Then will our material interests coincide admirably with our ideals.

CHAPTER X

OUR ARBITRATION RECORD

WHO has not heard it said that settlement of international disputes by arbitration is an American doctrine, consistently advocated by successive generations of statesmen throughout our history? Among those who believe that the United States should assume as her right the moral leadership of the world, it is accepted that this is the case. Instances can be cited to prove the assertion. It is unsafe, however, to confuse arbitration with isolation, with the Monroe Doctrine, and with the Open Door, as a peculiarly American policy, a policy that has become traditional. Are we sure that arbitration has always commended itself to us in our dealings with other nations?

As in the study of other doctrines of American foreign policy, we must try to keep ourselves in an objective frame of mind when we are discussing arbitration. Then we must consider why certain Americans at times have advocated arbitration as a fundamental doctrine and must examine the circumstances of each illustration. What we want to

know is whether the advocates of arbitration have been idealists, believing that the United States could lead the world to a new level of international relations even if it cost something and demanded sacrifices and risks, or whether the general policy and its specific illustrations can be reconciled with George Washington's canny observations that nations always act according to their own interests.

Benjamin Franklin and Alexander Hamilton were the earliest advocates of arbitration as a means of settling international disputes; and the principle was introduced into Jay's treaty with Great Britain in 1794 and Pinckney's with Spain in 1795. But it was only a principle. In the maelstrom of passion born of the Napoleonic Wars it was found impossible to arbitrate with Great Britain what might reasonably have been called questions of law, and we found ourselves in the War of 1812 with some of the arbitration partizans of the previous decade wildly clamoring for the conquest of Canada. May we not believe that the motive behind the attitude of Franklin and Hamilton was the distinct advantage to a weak and infant nation of the protection which arbitration would afford?

The Treaty of Ghent ended the War of 1812, but a supplementary treaty was necessary in 1818 to settle outstanding questions of fisheries, boundary, and the restoration of slaves. The fisheries ques-

tion remained a matter of controversy for nearly a century. We agreed to arbitrate the comparatively trifling issue of claims of American citizens to be indemnified for slaves carried off in the War of 1812. The Czar of Russia assessed the damages, which Great Britain paid. But when we similarly arbitrated the Maine-New Brunswick boundary in 1831 the Senate refused to accept the decision of the King of the Netherlands. The controversy went on for years; and in 1839, instead of resubmitting the issue to another neutral arbitrator, Congress passed an act authorizing the President "to resist any attempt on the part of Great Britain to enforce by arms her claim to exclusive jurisdiction over that part of the State of Maine" which was in dispute, and empowering him to employ the army and navy and enroll volunteers. It was a case of *j'y suis, j'y reste*. A few years later, when the conflict over the northwestern boundary was raging, the British Government repeatedly urged arbitration. But President Polk and James Buchanan, who was then secretary of state, told the British minister that Congress would not consent to submit the issue to an impartial tribunal. Public opinion was inflamed. This was the time of the slogan: "Fifty-four forty or fight." When the last detail of the Oregon boundary was still unsettled Great Britain once more proposed arbitration. We waited twelve

years, and only consented when Great Britain offered to arbitrate the Alabama claims.

Both the decisions of 1872 favored the United States. But three years later when the fisheries dispute, which had been submitted to arbitration, was decided in favor of the British, the American commissioner refused to accept the award, which was afterward paid, however, with ill grace.

In 1890 Congress adopted a resolution in favor of negotiating arbitration treaties with other nations. The scope of questions that we were willing to submit to arbitration was, of course, limited. In 1893 the Bering Sea sealing controversy was referred to an arbitration board. There were still minor outstanding questions between the United States and Canada, most important of which was the Alaskan boundary. After the Venezuela crisis with Great Britain an arbitration treaty was negotiated with the British; but the Senate rejected it. The Alaskan boundary was arbitrated in 1903, with a result that was a crushing blow to Canada.

All the questions arbitrated were of minor importance to the United States, and not one of them settled a question that public opinion considered vital or about which it had become excited. The test of our belief in arbitration as a means of avoiding war was made in February, 1898, when we could have given Spain the benefit of the doubt and

could have offered to call in a body of neutral experts to decide the probable cause of the *Maine* disaster. Even if we had stuck to the thesis that the Spanish Government was responsible, it would have been possible to join Spain in asking some impartial tribunal to assess the damages.

With Latin American states we have agreed to settle disputes by arbitration nine times since the Civil War. We regret to have to say, however, that none of these disputes was a serious one: most of them were trivial and involved only pecuniary claims that would never have led to war or even a show of force. When we have had serious troubles with our neighbors to the south, the American navy and (in the case of Mexico) the American army have been called in. We insisted upon the offender's doing as we said! At the second Pan American Congress in Mexico City in 1901, compulsory arbitration was suggested, but the majority of the countries, including the United States, would not commit themselves to more than the Hague Conference had agreed upon two years earlier. The outcome was really an extension of the Hague idea to America, as Mexico was the only American country besides the United States that had been invited to the conference of 1899.

Arbitration as a practical question in international relations came into being as a result of the

first Hague Conference. In the call for the conference the czar of Russia had expressed as one of the objects:

To accept in principle the employment of the good offices of mediation and optional arbitration in cases lending themselves thereto, with the object of preventing armed conflicts among nations; and understanding with respect to the mode of applying these good offices, and the establishment of a uniform practice in using them.

When the Hague Convention was formulated, an international tribunal of arbitration was created, to which moot questions could be referred if the parties should be agreeable. The American delegate signed with the following reservation

Nothing contained in this convention shall be so construed as to require the United States to depart from its traditional policy of not intruding upon, interfering with, or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state; nor shall anything in said convention be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions.

The joker in the first Hague Convention—a joker that has appeared in all our arbitration treaties and most of those between other powers—was the proviso that the disputes must not “involve the vital interests, independence, or honor of the disputant

states." In all the direct treaties after the Hague Convention, only two, those between Denmark and Holland and between Denmark and Italy, provided for obligatory arbitration of all differences. The only time we availed ourselves of the services of the machinery of the Hague was in a dispute with Mexico in 1902. In 1904 numerous treaties with other powers were negotiated; but the Senate, in ratifying, refused to relinquish an amendment providing that the Senate should decide in every case that arose whether the dispute was of a character that ought to be arbitrated. President Roosevelt declined to accept the amendment, and the treaties were discarded.

At the second Hague Convention in 1907, in which the Latin American states were included, improvements in the arbitration agreement were the first point on the agenda. The larger European powers, supporting Germany's proposal for a permanent tribunal, contended for a plan like that which was adopted for the Council of the League of Nations at Paris twelve years later. The great powers wanted permanent judges on the bench, with the small powers represented in rotation. The United States opposed this idea, insisting that all nations should be equal before the law, and also advocated obligatory arbitration of minor controversies. In both issues the American delegates

failed; and they signed the second Hague Convention with the same reservation as in 1899.

After the second Hague Conference the United States negotiated twenty-five arbitration treaties, of which all but three were ratified. But the treaties contained the same joker as in the first Hague Convention, and the Senate prevailed in regard to reserving for itself the final decision on the submission of each specific dispute to arbitration. In 1911 the Senate defeated President Taft's effort to have a joint high commission determine what disputes should be arbitrated.

President Wilson's conception of arbitration was bolder. He recommended that all questions failing diplomatic settlement be passed upon by an international commission, pending whose decisions there should be no declaration of war, and that the commission should have the initiative in intervening and in investigating disputes. But the World War was already begun before the earlier treaties had terminated, and there was no more than an academic interest in the negotiation of the new arbitration treaties embodying this principle. It did not stand the test of our liberty of the seas controversy with Great Britain and the far more serious submarine warfare controversy with Germany. Advocates of the amicable settlement of international disputes, such as the League to Enforce

Peace, espoused the idea of a permanent League of Nations, of which an International High Court of Justice should form an integral part.

This brief review of the attitude of the American Government and people toward arbitration presents facts which must be taken into consideration in determining what part the principle of arbitration should have in our foreign policy. We must admit that our past record is not brilliant and that we cannot in good faith urge upon other nations the practice of arbitration of international disputes as a means of avoiding war on the basis of our own record and demonstrated successes. We have neither preached arbitration consistently nor have we always practised when we did preach. We have never given arbitration a trial in a major dispute. We have never consented to automatic and obligatory arbitration of even limited categories of possible international difficulties. Above all, we cannot truthfully claim that the American people—and the Senate—would be willing to submit to arbitration a question affecting “the honor, the independence, or the vital interests” of the United States.

Public opinion and the Senate supported Mr. Wilson’s proposal that nations agree to wait for the finding of an international commission before going to war. A definite period of delay was sug-

gested, and, as an alternative to an international commission, a permanent joint commission might be substituted, which should act on its own initiative. As the joint commission would fairly represent the two contracting parties to an arbitration treaty, the objection to an outside organization's having the right to interfere automatically would be removed. It may be argued that the Wilson proposal is the most notable practical plan ever put forth as a deterrent to war; but the force of the argument would not be so great with other nations as with ourselves. Just here is where over-zealous American partizans of world peace fall into error. They assume that a line of conduct that is possible and reasonable for the United States is equally possible and reasonable for other countries. Then, having made this assumption, they are not slow to condemn those who hesitate to follow a path that they conclude must be safe for others because it is safe for ourselves.

Why do we not try to put ourselves in the very different place of other nations, and suspend judgment until we have honestly done this? We have a powerful navy, and the Panama Canal permits speedy naval concentration; our neighbors to the north and south are so inferior to us in man-power that sudden invasion across land frontiers need

never worry us. We are not dependent for our daily bread and for the functioning of our industries upon the uninterrupted maintenance of our communications with the outside world. The vast stretches of two oceans and our position of overwhelming predominance in the Western Hemisphere make it unnecessary for us to view secret submarine and aircraft mobilization as the European powers must view these new forces of warfare. Where we can afford to wait for a long period, in perfect security, while an arbitration commission investigated a quarrel, delay might easily mean for a power differently situated irreparable disaster. What happened in the summer of 1914 demonstrates how radically different are European problems of defense from our own. If one European nation mobilizes, its neighbors are compelled to follow suit; and a long period of inactivity under arms would wreck the finances and demoralize the armies of mobilized countries.

Our own history does not show any instance where arbitration was adhered to as a principle rather than resorted to for reasons of expediency or convenience. For minor difficulties that never would have led to war, arbitration has been successful. But if arbitration is only voluntary, will any strong nation, thinking that it can get what it wants

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by a show of superior force, magnanimously give up the advantage of a winning argument? And if arbitration excludes questions of vital interests or national honor—the only questions that cause wars—of what use is it as a preventive of war?

CHAPTER XI

OUR ADVOCACY OF THE LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

AFTER the war with Russia, Admiral Togo issued a general order to the Japanese Navy appealing for the continued augmentation of Japanese fighting strength in order that the fruits of victory might be made secure. "All the facts of history, old and new, are dependent to a certain degree upon political exigencies, but mainly upon the question whether or not military men forget the time of war in time of peace. Heaven gives the laurels of victory in war only to those who keep themselves in training in time of peace, and win the battle before it is fought," declared the admiral. He gave to his men as their motto an ancient saying, "Tighten your helmet strings after a victory."

All human relationships and activities entail some sort of struggle or conflict. Our experience, therefore, prompts us to accept without question the soundness of the Japanese admiral's warning. The argument he uses and the conclusions he

reaches are embodied in Holy Writ. Does not St. Paul tell us that in the Christian life a sense of security is false, that we must keep our armor bright and shiny, and that the battle is to the strong? Modern philosophy, working with science, seems to have reached the conclusion that all forms of life are in constant warfare and that the fittest survive. The tragic experiences of the world since 1914 confirm what instinct and reason have taught us, that statesmanship, diplomacy, and public opinion are as powerless in the face of mass passions of hate and fear as were the heroes of Sophocles confronted with their predestined fate.

Participating in the debate on disarmament in the House of Commons on July 23, 1923, Mr. Asquith recalled what he had said as premier in 1914, that Great Britain would not obtain the end that led the British to embark on the war unless they succeeded in establishing what Gladstone called the substitution of public right for force in the councils of Europe and in the world at large. "Those were our ideals," said Mr. Asquith, "and the war was fought and victory remained with the Allies. How far have we advanced since the Armistice toward the practical attainment of those ideals? Let us look at the facts. Europe is still an armed camp. There are more men actually under arms, or ready for military purposes, on the continent of Europe

at the present moment than there were when the war broke out in 1914."

The sober truth of Mr. Asquith's statement is incontestable. And yet the war had been undertaken for the purpose of breaking up a military machine that threatened to dominate Europe. As a result of the war, Germany's military and naval forces and her armaments had been completely destroyed; and she had been deprived of the auxiliary reservoir afforded by the Austro-Hungarian alliance. Similarly, Bulgaria, "the Prussia of the Balkans," had lost her army and her armaments. Idealists contended during the war that an Allied victory would mean the lifting of the intolerable military burdens of Europe, which were due to the seizure of Alsace-Lorraine and the military menace of Germany. What happened in Europe was what has always happened, the shifting of power and the consequent change of rôles from Peter to Paul. The victors, instead of demobilizing or even reducing their armaments, acted as victors have always acted. They began to prepare for the next war.

The people of the United States (and the people of British dominions as well) look aghast from their vantage-point of distance upon the results of the war in Europe that was to be a "war to end war" and in which they participated with that object in view. There is disgust, disillusionment, despair.

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The two words "Never again!" which we originally used to express our hope that war was going to be banished from the new world we were making, now express the determination of Americans, Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders not to pour out their blood and spend their money ever again chasing a will-o'-the-wisp in Europe.

But a very large portion of public opinion in English-speaking countries has been carrying on an active propaganda for the adoption of the principle of limitation of armament, agreed to and adjusted among themselves and then imposed upon the other powers, if necessary by employing an Anglo-American economic blockade against recalcitrant powers. Propaganda has been ably conducted and has had an influence that ought not to be underestimated. Disarmament is popular with church and labor people, and it appeals to the "man in the street" because it promises relief from taxation and allays in him the fears that have been aroused of the appalling horrors of new engines of destruction. The two most common arguments for the limitation of armaments are the beneficial effect upon taxes and the avoidance of poison gases and high explosives showered on us from the air. The arguments in favor of limitation of armaments that meet with a sympathetic echo in the hearts and minds of the people as a whole are admirably pre-

sented in two forceful books by Will Irwin, "The Next War" and "Christ or Mars?"

A tangible and notable result of public sentiment in the United States was the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments, which succeeded in checking the competitive building of capital ships by Great Britain, the United States, and Japan for a period of ten years. Strictly limited as were the results of the Washington Conference, they did mark a step forward; and this precedent has encouraged the champions of disarmament to work through numerous channels for the extension of the principle to other types of naval craft and to the great problem of land armament. So wide-spread is the interest in this great cause that no study of American foreign policy—or of international relations in general—can afford to ignore it.

Let us trace briefly the history of disarmament proposals and the attitude of the United States toward them, and let us see whether it is possible to assume that European nations are in a position to adopt principles and proposals that it is possible and reasonable for us to adopt.

Arbitration and limitation of armaments as new principles in the conduct of international affairs have necessarily gone hand in hand. The Czar of Russia recognized this fact in the call to the first

Hague Conference when he said that a leading topic of discussion would have to be the practicability of limiting the progressive increase of land and naval armaments. Of the eight articles on the agenda, the first four were devoted to this question. The Czar suggested an understanding to limit for a fixed period the military and naval forces allowed to each nation, and the amounts nations should devote to military and naval purposes in their budgets; abstention from increasing the manufacture of guns, firearms, and explosives; agreement as to the use of explosives already existing; and the prohibition of submarines and of war-vessels with rams.

The instructions given by Secretary Hay to the American delegate are illuminating. Because our military and naval forces were "at present so far below the normal quota," the United States did not consider that the question of limitation of armaments "could be profitably discussed." In regard to limitation and restricted use of weapons and materials of war, Mr. Hay declared that the Czar's proposal "seemed lacking in practicability, and the discussion of these propositions would probably prove provocative of diversion rather than unanimity of views." Mr. Hay believed that "the expediency of restraining the inventive genius of our people in the direction of devising means of defense

is by no means clear, and, considering the temptation to which men and nations may be exposed in time of conflict, it is doubtful if an international agreement to this end would prove effective."

Secretary Hay had voiced the universal sentiment on this question. Nothing was done about limitation of armaments, and the agenda of the second Hague Conference discreetly omitted the subject. The attitude of the United States had, however, changed in eight years, and the American delegates were instructed to bring up the topic and to participate in the discussion of it if the opportunity should arise. Between 1899 and 1907 we had come to see that arbitration and limitation of armaments could not be dissociated from each other in a constructive discussion of improving international relations.

Insuperable difficulties, however, arose when it was discovered that each of the powers was willing to consider specific proposals where it was to their advantage but that they were unwilling to commit themselves where any form of restriction might work against their interests. Consequently nothing was accomplished toward disarmament, and the deliberations on this question were as fruitless as on the question of arbitration. One saw at both Hague Conferences what had always been true when statesmen got together. There was no devotion shown to any principle or proposal on its own

merits. Bitter opposition developed to whatever suggestion was made that might prove disadvantageous; while the statesmen were keen to champion suggestions that might work to the advantage of their own countries.

In disputes with the British Foreign Office the American State Department contended that the three-mile limit should be interpreted as following the sinuosities of the coast in the Atlantic, where we wanted to fish, but that there should be the broadest possible interpretation of inland waters in the Pacific, where we wanted to protect the seals! At the second Hague Conference the British delegates were keen for the prohibition of all mines in naval warfare, but they would not listen to the adoption of rigid and comprehensive rules for blockade and contraband. Mines were a danger to the British fleet, while the adoption of rules advocated by nations with smaller navies tended to restrict the advantages enjoyed in war by the predominant naval power.

The World War came. Germany abused the advantage her land power gave her on the continent of Europe and attempted to free herself from the strangle hold of British sea-power by trying to induce neutral nations to put an embargo on sales of war supplies to belligerents. When that failed, she disregarded usage and every consideration of

humanity in her employment of submarines. Neutral public opinion naturally turned against Germany, condemning her methods of waging war on land and sea. Even if there had been no exaggeration of Germany's crimes, even if the Germans had refrained from doing much that they did, it is doubtful whether the German thesis would have won much support. The German argument took no account of the fact that what was sauce for the goose was sauce for the gander. It was blindly assumed by German partizans that Germany should be allowed, as a natural right, to do as she pleased on land, where she was supreme, while her enemies should be restricted in their activities on sea, where they had the upper hand. But after the World War victorious nations, including the United States, failed to take to heart and apply to themselves the lesson which their victory had taught to the vanquished Germans. The treaties of the Paris settlement imposed upon the defeated countries the first practical experiment the world has ever had in disarmament. It is true that the bitterness engendered by the long struggle may fairly be considered the immediate cause of the failure to profit by a unique opportunity. But as we begin to gain a little perspective we are forced to admit that war hysteria was only partially responsible for the peace settlement. On the other side were forces that con-

structive statesmen might have used—and with success—to marshal public opinion in support of some reasonable and moderate plan for a gradual decrease of land and naval armament. The common people were tax-burdened and profoundly war-weary.

But instead of profiting by the complete collapse of the German army and navy, by the opportunity of treating with the defeated powers singly and not as a *bloc*, by the temporary eclipse of Russia, and by the sense of security they ought to have experienced through the destruction of enemy war material, the victors saw only the chance to increase their own strength at the expense of one another. With Germany eliminated, the problem remained fundamentally the same. Victors began to fear one another and to tighten their helmet strings after the victory, not because the vanquished enemy still needed watching but because the victors regarded one another as potential enemies.

We Americans need to ask ourselves and to answer honestly two questions.

If we had not had a great navy and if we had not been actually embarked upon a naval construction program that would soon have given us the first rank among naval powers, would we have been willing to call the Washington Conference and to make the proposals that we made there? If Canada

and Mexico were states with greater population than ours would we be content with a small army and would we offer to submit the question of land armaments to an international conference? The reader who feels that he can say "yes" to both of these questions is acting in good faith when he calls upon European nations to follow the admirable example set by the United States. Without being illogical, such an American is able to point to the Washington Conference as an earnest of our enlightened self-sacrifice and to boast that we have 1.33 per thousand under arms, while France has 17.60. It is this type of mind that wants to show European nations how countries can live side by side without fear, citing as an example our thousands of miles of unfortified frontiers with Mexico and Canada.

But those who think straight do not deceive themselves. They realize that our national attitude on disarmament is due to the naval advantages we have already gained and to our geographical position far more than to our unselfish devotion to a great principle. In 1899 Secretary Hay instructed the delegates to the first Hague Conference not to discuss limitation of navies and armies, stating quite frankly his reason, i. e., that we were far behind other nations in strength in proportion to our wealth and size and that we did not intend to bind ourselves by commitments that would keep us in

an inferior position. But Secretary Hughes, in 1921, was able to propose a limitation of capital ships, knowing that he had a good argument for bringing Great Britain to terms. Our "biggest navy" program was actually being carried out. There would have been overwhelming public sentiment against our acceptance of any ratio that left us second to Great Britain. In other words, when we had reached the top we were willing to do away with the expense of further competitive armament.

When we talk about the big army Germany used to have and the present military strength of France and other nations, we assume a moral superiority that has no foundation in fact. Human nature is pretty much the same the world over, and if the conditions were the same in America as in Europe, and if we faced the same strategic problems that the European nations face, there is not much doubt of the policy we should adopt in connection with our army.

A striking example of how the shoe pinches on the other foot is afforded by the discussion of aircraft construction in the London and Paris press. At the Washington Conference the French delegates remonstrated against the ratio of capital ships suggested for them by Secretary Hughes and heartily seconded by Mr. Balfour. They pointed out that France was a great power in a peculiar

position, with two coasts to guard and far-flung colonies. Why should she agree to limit her capital ships for ten years to one third of those of the United States and Great Britain? The answer was that the only sensible way of reaching an agreement was to face the facts and establish the ratio on the basis of the existing navies. Now that Great Britain has expressed a desire to make an agreement with France to avoid competitive aircraft building, the French bring up the Washington Conference and contend that the same argument holds good for determining the ratio of airships. At the present moment France has four times as many airships as Great Britain, and her problems on land give her the same justification for her enormous air fleet as Great Britain's imperial problems in the seven seas give the British for their huge navy.

But the British rise in their wrath at the assumption of a limitation agreement in the air on the basis of existing strength. The London newspapers call the French proposal (which is identical with their own at Washington) preposterous and inadmissible. No, Great Britain must have as great strength as France in aircraft! Then, retort the French, why should not France have as many capital ships as Great Britain?

In connection with arbitration we have seen that the difficulty lies in the fact that the powerful re-

fuse to surrender, for the sake of abstract justice, any of the privileges that their strength gives them. It is exactly the same in the disarmament question. We Americans are no different from any other nation, not a whit. Others will respect us more and listen to us with better grace if we drop the "I am holier than thou" attitude in our insistence upon limitation of land and sea armaments. As long as nations have a feeling of separate identity they will have the instinct of self-preservation. They will not exchange realities for uncertainties. They will not accept a position of permanent inferiority when they believe they have a chance of bettering themselves. And history does not afford an example of a nation not decadent that accepted the verdict of arms in one war.

There is a twofold danger in the present disarmament propaganda, as it has been carried on in the United States by those who are unwilling to study the history of their own country and to acquaint themselves with the problems of world politics. In the first place, their teaching tends to undermine the practical authority of their own country among the nations of the world; in the second place, their proposals, generally speaking, tend to destroy the wholesome and constructive influence that the United States might bring to bear to do away with the evil of competitive armaments. It is better for

us to have no policy at all on this question than to have an unintelligent one.

There is much work to be done before we can begin to discuss with other nations a general program for the limitation and reduction of armaments. We have to do our part, and our full part, in bringing about the access of all nations, including our own, to the world's raw materials and to world markets on a footing of equality; in creating an impartial world court of international justice that will function automatically to adjust disputes; and in participating in a truly international police force, maintaining order for the common good of all.

Mistaking effects for causes is a sure road to disillusionment and disaster.

CHAPTER XII

RECOGNITION OF NEW GOVERNMENTS AND NEW NATIONS

THE United States was born of a successful rebellion. In our infancy the success of the war against Great Britain depended upon the recognition of our separate nationhood and the ability to enter into diplomatic relations with other countries. We sorely needed the aid we received from France. More than eighty years later it was fully as vital to us that Great Britain and France and other European countries should withhold recognition of the Confederacy. From the beginning of our national life the problem of recognition (a) of new governments resulting from internal revolution in countries with which we had friendly diplomatic relations or (b) of new countries born like ourselves of rebellion followed by secession has always been a difficult one.

We have never laid down any definite policy on the question of recognition. It had not been possible to do so; for recognition has frequently been not so much a matter of principle as of expediency.

The factors to be taken into consideration have been so many and varied that the evolution of a specific doctrine has been impossible. Public opinion has not played an important rôle in this question. While declarations of war need the consent of Congress, and while the ratification of treaties depend upon the Senate, the power of giving or withholding recognition is in the hands of the President. Diplomatic representatives are personal agents of rulers, accredited to other rulers. A heavy responsibility is thus placed upon the President, who naturally hesitates to commit the country to a policy that might embarrass his administration. When recognition has presented such a difficulty, the President in office has generally played safe. Watchful waiting was not invented by Woodrow Wilson.

No case has been more difficult than the first one. The French Revolution began in the year that George Washington was inaugurated as first President, and from the outset it presented an issue as dangerous as it was delicate. For more than two years we were able to preserve the fiction of an unchanged French Government. But in August, 1792, Minister Morris reported the deposition of King Louis XVI and asked for instructions. Secretary Jefferson put off answering until November, when he said in a non-committal letter:

It accords with our principles to acknowledge any Government to be rightful which is formed by the will of the nation, substantially declared. With such a Government every kind of business may be done. But there are some matters which I conceive might be transacted with a government *de facto*, such, for instance, as the reforming of the unfriendly restrictions on our commerce and navigation.

The king was put to death in January, 1793. In March, Jefferson wrote again:

We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own Government is founded—that every nation may govern itself to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms of its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether King, Convention, Assembly, Committee, President, or anything else it may choose. The will of the nation is the only essential thing to be regarded.

President Washington evidently thought that there were other essential considerations and that, despite the pressure brought to bear upon him from all sides for and against recognition, delay was the most prudent policy. When he found that our commerce was suffering by non-recognition, however, he received a minister from revolutionary France. The next year Minister Adams wrote from the Netherlands that the conquest of Holland by France seemed imminent. What was he to do? He received the following instructions:

The maxim of the President towards France has been to follow the government of the people. Whatsoever régime a majority of them shall establish is both *de facto* and *de jure* that to which our minister there addresses himself. If therefore the independence of the United Netherlands continues, it is wished that you make no difficulty in passing from the old to any new constitution of the people.

But the direct question asked by Adams was really unanswered. He was told that his mission would end if France should conquer the country. Even in that event, however, he was to remain on the ground as a neutral observer!

For the next twenty years Europe was in constant turmoil. The status of Holland changed several times. But that was of minor importance. Napoleon managed to upset completely the internal and international status of European countries whose holdings in America and whose commerce made uninterrupted diplomatic relations a prime consideration of our foreign policy. Prussia and Spain were conquered by France. New countries were formed in central Europe. A French general became king of Sweden. The war was carried to the West Indies and South America. Louisiana was transferred from Spain to France and purchased by us. It looked as if Great Britain would take Florida from Spain. We went to war with Great Britain independently of European politics.

Then came the two treaties of Vienna and the revolt of Latin American provinces from Spain.

It was soon realized that the problem of recognition was constantly bringing up far-reaching questions, involving our neutrality and at the same time compromising our commerce. If we gave recognition it would seem like taking sides; if we withheld it our carrying-trade (of vital importance at that time to our prosperity) would suffer.

Out of the welter and confusion two cardinal facts stood forth clearly: (1) that our recognition policy could not be based upon ideals or principles but had to be determined by expediency; and (2) that vesting wholly in the hands of the executive the decision as to how and when other governments should be recognized was one of the wisest of constitutional provisions. Occasions are numerous when the Senate, if it had had the whip-hand over the President, would have forced the State Department to take hasty and unwise steps.

The recognition of Latin American Republics was raised before the War of 1812, when Venezuela and the revolutionary junta of Buenos Aires sent envoys to Washington. In view of the extraordinary status of Spain in Europe and the fact that the boundaries of the revolting Spanish-American provinces were wholly uncertain, there was nothing to do for some years but to acquiesce in the opinion

of President Madison, expressed in his message to Congress in December, 1811, when he pointed out the impossibility of recognition but acknowledged the obligation of the United States "to take a deep interest in the destinies of other parts of the American continent, to cherish reciprocal sentiments of good will with Latin Americans, to regard the progress of events, and not to be unprepared for whatever order of things may be ultimately established."

In 1818, and for several years later, recognition of Latin American republics was an issue of internal politics in the United States, used by Henry Clay to embarrass and discredit the administration. Clay's arguments were plausible. He declared that the time had come for the United States to take the leadership in the Western Hemisphere, and that withholding recognition tended to draw the Latin American countries, in diplomacy and commerce, into the sphere of influence of Europe, instead of into that of the United States. A few years later Clay induced the House to adopt a resolution favoring recognition, using the argument: "Let us no longer watch the nod of any European politician. Let us become real and true Americans, and place ourselves at the head of the American system." But the State Department felt that the more pressing question was to secure the transfer of Florida

from Spain to the United States. Both President Madison and President Monroe refused to yield to congressional pressure and risk jeopardizing the treaty with Spain that was being negotiated. Only after the Florida treaty was signed, in March, 1822, did Washington recognize the new Latin American republics. The conflict established the principle that recognition was a prerogative of the President, to be accorded at his discretion.

After Florida was safely in our possession, Secretary Adams wrote to the Spanish minister:

The Government of the United States, far from consulting the dictates of a policy questionable in its morality, yielded to an obligation of duty of the highest order by recognizing as independent states nations which, after deliberating their right to that character, have maintained and established it against all resistance which had been or could be brought to oppose it. Recognition is the mere acknowledgment of existing facts with a view to the regular establishment with the nations newly formed of those relations, political or commercial, which it is a moral obligation of civilized and Christian nations to entertain reciprocally with one another.

Through experience American diplomacy had thus traveled a long way in the generation from Jefferson in 1792 to John Quincy Adams in 1822. Should we or should we not recognize a government? Not its right to speak for the people, but the interest of the United States, was the criterion.

Recognition had become, and it has remained, a question of expediency. The United States has never since pretended to show its sympathy, and throw its moral support into the balance, in any case of a people struggling against odds for independence or making its way from autocracy to democracy by internal revolution. Self-deception on this point is foolish.

Opportunities have not been lacking for making recognition a weapon to help peoples enslaved by a foreign power or by their own despots. We need only to cite the cases of Belgium in 1830, of several European peoples in 1848, of Hungary in 1849, of the Italian states from 1849 to 1866, of the Balkan states at various times, and so on down to the present day. On the other hand, we have never protested effectively against the destruction or limitation of liberties of peoples, where we might have done it, to wit, Schleswig-Holstein in 1864; Alsace-Lorraine in 1871; and the shameful decisions of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. We have invariably accepted the *faits accomplis* of European aggression in other continents. None of the transfers of sovereignty in Africa have been withheld recognition by the United States. The political status of the whole continent was changed during the forty years from 1883 to 1923 by armed intervention, notably in Egypt, Tunisia, Tripoli, Mo-

rocco, the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and the Congo. We have acquiesced in the encroachments of the European powers in Japan on the sovereignty of nations with which we have concluded treaties, to wit, Oman, Persia, Burma, Siam, China, and Korea. Agitation in favor of subject peoples struggling for independence or of sovereign peoples fighting to retain independence has left the American State Department cold. On occasions, as we have seen in discussing the Open Door, we addressed to other powers notes provoked by changes of political status in different parts of the world; but the reasons upon which we have based the protest have been the rights and interests of the American citizens, American commerce, and American investments.

In cases where we have withheld recognition, notably Mexico after Diaz and Russia after czarism, there has been much talk of moral reasons for our action. For instance, we do not recognize governments that are not clearly established by and dependent upon the will of the people, and we cannot consent to establish relations of amity and commerce with governments that conspire against the liberties of other peoples and refuse to recognize the principle of the sanctity of private property. And yet, when we get down to the bottom of the matter, there is really no principle involved and

there is no traditional consistency that will explain and defend the withholding of recognition in these cases. All the world knows that Mexico under Diaz and Russia under Czar Nicholas II did not have governments dependent upon the will of the people. We have lately negotiated a treaty of amity and commerce at Lausanne with a revolutionary government whose existence is due to armed opposition to solemn treaty engagements and whose acts of cruelty and disregard of the principle of inviolability of private property match the misdeeds of Soviet Russia.

During the Civil War, when it was important not to offend France, the State Department was able to explain away at Paris a congressional resolution denouncing the empire set up in Mexico by French bayonets by assuring Napoleon III that recognition of the new régime was purely a function of the President and that Mr. Lincoln would attend to it in due time. But when the war ended victoriously and we did not have to delay longer, Washington recognized the native government of Juarez, which was fighting Maximilian. When the German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles by troops in a country not their own, and under the hegemony of the Kingdom of Prussia, which had crushed out the liberties of other German states by force, we were almost indecently prompt in our

recognition of the new state of the Hohenzollerns. The star case of hasty recognition, however, is that of the revolutionary government in Panama, when we were engaged in the canal controversy with Colombia. We did not wait to see whether the secession movement was genuinely popular or whether Colombia was going to demonstrate inability to maintain the federal authority in Panama. We refused to recognize the government set up in Greece as a result of the general election which recalled Constantine, and we have maintained that refusal on the ground that the present government has not received the indorsement of the electorate. But our policy toward Italy, Bulgaria, and Spain, following *coups d'état*, is diametrically opposite.

Recognition, therefore, is not given or withheld on moral grounds and follows no general traditional rule. In each case the President, advised by the State Department, makes his decision in accordance with what he believes to be the interest of the United States. He cannot allow sentiment to influence him. In forming a judgment on the merit of our Government's policy in any particular case of recognition, we should keep in mind precedents. Discussion of the wisdom of granting or withholding recognition must exclude moral considerations, for recognition is a question of diplomatic tactics.

CHAPTER XIII

THE OBSTACLES TO JOINING THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

IN crises we witness the blessed phenomenon of the innate common sense of the American people. It is the fashion to decry democracy and to assert that the masses are fundamentally and incurably ignorant. The people, we are told are indifferent and are easily stampeded. Majority rule, it is asserted, makes for corruption and inefficiency. One is permitted to admit only a modicum of truth when these notions are entertained concerning any country where public schools are attended and where newspapers are read; in so far as the United States is concerned, they are wrong.

Public opinion frequently becomes confused and more frequently seems to be indifferent to great issues; but it is not misled for a long time, and we have yet to see wrong verdicts rendered in critical national elections. Statesmen make mistakes; judges fail to interpret rightly the spirit of the law and of the time; false prophets are acclaimed; financiers and labor leaders bungle their jobs; church-

men and publicists and the intelligentsia go off on tangents. The nation as a whole knows admirably how to right the boat when it is being rocked.

There are times when popular verdicts are not constructive. But the common people at least know what not to do. Failure in leadership and not the fickleness of the electorate is pretty generally the cause of the overthrow of idols. When statesmen make mistakes, the people know it and show that they know it. I do not need to quote the sentence in which Lincoln summed up the saving grace of democracy.

In the autumn of 1920, after the Versailles Covenant had been hotly debated for a year and a half, Mr. Wilson wanted the Presidential election to be a "solemn referendum" on the question of whether or not the United States should enter the League of Nations without reservations. Although many factors other than international affairs contributed to the repudiation of the Democratic party, the enormous majority received by Mr. Harding can be explained in no other way than as a verdict against the League of Nations constituted by the Treaty of Versailles. The decision was final. There is little chance of its being reversed unless new arguments (we have not heard them yet) are put before the

people or unless the constitution of the League is radically changed.

Pro-League propaganda in America in favor of the existing Covenant is futile. It is futile for two reasons. The pro-Leaguers have never squarely met and overcome those objections to the Geneva organization that influenced the people to refuse to enter it. Nor are they able to demonstrate how the United States could participate, to her own advantage and to that of other nations, in an organization created and run by certain European powers for advancing their own particular interests. The covenant of the League failed to win our approval before the organization began to function. And now, with actions speaking louder than words, the League is less attractive to Americans than it was four years ago.

Keeping the issue before the public, however, has served a useful purpose. We owe much to the enthusiasm and devotion, misguided though it may be, of the men and women who have spoken in and out of season in defense of the Versailles League. Their propaganda has had the wholesome effect of making us realize that we have opportunities and responsibilities as a world power. Repudiation of the League of Nations for good and sound reasons has not freed us from the problem of par-

ticipation in world affairs. We cannot afford to be indifferent to what is going on in other parts of the world; and we must stand ready and willing to coöperate with other nations for the common good. Opponents of joining the Versailles League and of mixing up in the internal political quarrels of Europe do not assert that foreign affairs are no business of ours. If we did not know it before 1914, we do know now that rigid aloofness and the refusal to play an active rôle in encouraging world peace and promoting international social and economic well-being will jeopardize our security and prosperity.

Because this great truth is recognized thinking people all over the United States are dissatisfied with the reaffirmation of the isolation policy, however reasonable or correct, in its negative form. Almost everybody thinks the United States ought to do something, and almost everybody, even though opposed to the League, is ready to grasp at straws. The nation-wide interest in Mr. Levermore's proposal for the coöperation of the United States with the League of Nations is an illustration of the nation-wide sentiment that the United States should play some sort of an active rôle in world affairs. The Bok peace plan contest was cleverly promoted; and it received an astonishing amount of free advertising. But if the subject had not appealed to the

people Mr. Bok would have failed to attract the attention of the nation to his offer; and if the newspapers and magazines had not been aware of the genuine interest of their readers, they would never have coöperated in an unprecedented way to help the Bok committee make a referendum on the winning plan.

Not only would American public opinion undoubtedly support our coöperation with other nations for the establishment of a more tolerable and less fragile world order; but also does American public opinion, on the eve of a Presidential election, ask for initiative and leadership on the part of our Government in helping the world along to better things and better days.

The question, therefore, is not one of the end to be attained but of the means of attaining it. We refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles and to accept membership in the League of Nations. But that momentous decision was not to be interpreted as a withdrawal within our shell. Mr. Harding, standing on the Republican platform, pledged the new administration to constructive effort toward world peace and international coöperation. The Washington Conference and the advocacy by President Harding and Secretary Hughes of our participation in the High Court of International Justice afforded ample proof of the good faith of the

administration and of popular support for the policy of international coöperation.

Unfortunately the League advocates proved themselves to be "die-hards." They wanted the whole hog or nothing. Unconsciously they played into the hands of the politicians by their uncompromising attitude. Before he was well embarked on his fatal Western trip President Harding discovered that he was not going to be allowed to advocate participation in the World Court on the merits of that issue alone. Bitter-enders in his own party and pro-Leaguers vied with one another to assert that our acceptance of the World Court was entry into the League by the back door. These tactics, far from helping the League cause, resulted in discrediting the World Court. We must not allow ourselves to be discouraged, however, by the folly of the enthusiasts and the insincerity of the politicians. The corrective is a sober and objective discussion of a question of international coöperation. If not the League of Nations, swallowed hook and sinker, what?

A glorious vision was held up to the world during the war, a vision of a cleansing League that would destroy some of the dirt, at least, that makes inevitable the awful disease we call war. The Paris Conference turned the noble conception of a League of Nations into a clever combine of the inner circle

of the victors to exploit the advantages of the victors. The Versailles Covenant did not establish the kind of a League of Nations that would make possible the triumph of right over might and the successful working of the principle of international coöperation, and its constitution was intentionally framed in such a way as to render fruitless efforts from within to remedy the flaws in the Covenant. The Versailles Covenant is indissolubly bound up with a treaty of peace which the world now recognizes to be impracticable of execution, contrary to the ideals for the triumph of which the United States entered the conflict, and war breeding. What has happened in four years of attempting to function as an impartial international organization does not tend to convince Americans that the existing League of Nations is chartered and organized in such a way that it can be the instrument for promoting international good will and for lessening the chances of war.

From an idealistic point of view, therefore, it does not seem that the United States could accomplish anything useful by being a member of the League. From a practical standpoint, the League's activities so far have been directed to the adjustment of purely European questions in which we have no interest at stake. Were we in the League, we should have found ourselves committed to the

carrying out of policies the advantages of which—doubtful, at that!—accrued solely to other nations.

Speaking at Manchester shortly before the opening of the Peace Conference, Mr. Wilson prophetically declared that the United States would never enter a league that was not a league of all nations for the common good of all. The exclusive character of the present organization, whose machinery can keep Germany and Russia definitely out and whose activities are controlled by a Council with certain permanent members, would make the participation of the United States intolerable. Our population is of pan-European origin, and the foreign policy of our Government could not, therefore, be committed to any line of action in Europe tending to keep certain nations in political and economic subjection to others. Under present conditions this country could not be a member of the Council of the League of Nations without entering into a virtual alliance with certain European Powers.

In the summer of 1919 Senator Knox, whose knowledge of statecraft was profound and had been gained by intimate experience in international affairs as secretary of state, pointed out that the United States could not enter the League of Nations because of its dependence on the Treaty of Versailles. That treaty had attempted to combine two

diametrically opposite purposes, in only one of which the United States had an interest. According to Senator Knox—and he was basing his position upon the unbroken traditions of the American people—the entry of the United States into a political league was repugnant to our instincts and opposed to our interests. Before the organization set up by the Treaty of Versailles could be used by the United States as a medium for international co-operation it would have to be divorced from the Treaty of Versailles and be changed from a political into a judicial league. Otherwise the United States would find herself used as a cat's-paw when convenient and ignored when inconvenient.

Protagonists of the League make two charges of lack of good faith, one against the Senate and the other against the American people. The Senate is accused of having blocked our entry into the League because of rancor against President Wilson; and the American people are indicted as responsible for post-bellum conditions in Europe. Mr. Wilson's excoriation of American foreign policy since the World War gradually became, in his mind and that of his followers, an indictment of the American nation. It reached its climax of invective in Mr. Wilson's address on the fifth anniversary of the Armistice with Germany.

In the eyes of the partizans of the Geneva League

the shameful and ignoble conduct of the United States is patent. Not only did we "fail to see the light" and refuse "the moral leadership of the nations" and "break the heart of the world," but we are now supposed to be in the outer darkness in company with Germany, Russia, Turkey, and Mexico. In the mean time, according to the Geneva League advocates, the League of Nations, a "going concern," is bravely struggling to salvage civilization without our aid. We are told that, while the arch-devils responsible for the betrayal of the world's faith in us are Henry Cabot Lodge and other senators, the American people at large are to blame for the disgrace of the United States, and that we have ourselves to thank for the low esteem in which this country is held by the other nations who kept bravely on after the war in their great effort to save the world, discouraged, of course, but not wholly paralyzed by our shameful desertion.

The pity of it is that this arrant nonsense has misled many sincere and ardent advocates of world peace and international coöperation; enough of them, in fact, to divide into two camps those who ought to be working together to help America take her place in the world.

The accusation against senators, that they are politicians, is admitted. Party advantage enters into every debate on international as well as in-

ternal affairs. But when it comes to making a great decision committing the country and not a particular party, senators are like other citizens, Americans first and party leaders secondarily. In 1919 and 1920, although most of the senators had their misgivings, there was a majority ready to ratify the treaty and willing to consent to American participation in the League. Certain reservations to the Covenant of the League, however, based upon constitutional considerations and upon our consistent foreign policy, were stipulated. These reservations were of a character justified by unbroken precedent in ratifying treaties. It was President Wilson who refused to accept reservations; it was President Wilson who, appealing from the Senate to the people, made impossible our coöperation with other nations in 1920 along lines similar to those suggested by the winner of the Bok peace plan contest in 1924 and approved by most of the critics of the United States Senate.

Nothing is more distasteful than to be compelled to write anything but good of the dead. There is no recorder of contemporary history who does not appreciate and pay tribute to the high idealism and prophetic rôle of the late Woodrow Wilson. But we must be just also to the living; for some day they, too, will pass on, and they have a right to their place in the history of these troubled times. Re-

spect for the dead does not necessitate suppressing or distorting facts.

Pending the verdict of the electorate, we had to remain aloof from Europe. As the American people have always done and as they always will do when confronted with a similar decision, they voted against the obligatory participation of the United States in European affairs. The arguments for and against reservations were fully presented in every hamlet in the country. It was the judgment of the people that acceptance of Article X of the Covenant would have committed us to obligatory and unconstitutional action.

Viewed objectively, the evidence tends to vindicate the attitude of the American Senate in 1919 and to make us thankful for the verdict of the people in the Presidential election of 1920. The majority of the protagonists of the League now admit their error, although they hate to do so. Their comments on the Bok peace plan indicate that they have come around to a saner and more reasonable viewpoint. When protagonists of the existing League of Nations denied the implied obligations in Article X and when they at the same time argued that Article X and Article XVI did not commit us to a policy contrary to the Constitution and to our interests, it was difficult to see why they objected so strenuously to the reservations. But since the de-

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bate began five years ago, the League has come into existence and it has been tested. What was an academic question, treated speculatively, has become a practical question. We now have facts upon which to base our conclusion. We know the League's own attitude toward amending Article X; we have had other states awakening to the disadvantages of that article; and we are able to judge the efficacy of the League from the way it has functioned.

After several years of membership in the League, Canadian statesmen saw what the American senators had foreseen, the annoyance and the danger of an American country's belonging to an organization committed to the solving of problems of purely European concern. Canada proposed in 1923 that Article X be amended (1) to "take into account the geographical situation of countries in fixing their duties as League members"; and (2) that "while the decisions of the Council should be deemed highly important, no nation should be under obligation to engage in military operations without full consent of its government and in accord with its own constitution." The amendments, referred to the nations belonging to the League, were overwhelmingly defeated. Canada now wishes that she had made her reservations before entering the League.

There is no evidence to support the accusation

of the responsibility of the United States for the present situation in Europe because of our failure to enter the League of Nations. To affirm that the trend of events would have been different had we been represented on the Council of the League is pure conjecture. No major problem of post-bellum Europe has been submitted to the League of Nations; and in cases where the League might have intervened to work constructively for the preservation of peace, as in the reparations controversy and in Italy's troubles with her Balkan neighbors, its existence has been ignored or its competency flatly denied.

Had we been in the League we should probably have given unwelcome advice and have antagonized and alienated our major associates in the World War, one after the other. This actually happened during the Peace Conference, and open breaks were averted only because a solid front was essential if peace terms were to be dictated to Germany. Mr. Ray Stannard Baker's well documented volumes on "Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement" are a revelation of the hostility constantly shown to President Wilson's constructive suggestions for a durable peace. Our advice was irksome and bitterly resented when our material support was still essential to the victors in imposing peace upon Germany; and Mr. Wilson was frank in explaining the necessity

for compromises that were disastrous to a real peace and antagonistic to his own ideals so eloquently expressed and so clearly reiterated during the war. The certainty and embarrassment of thus futilely making ourselves unpopular was pointed out by Mr. Hoover to President Wilson in a memorandum on American participation in the commissions set up by the Treaty of Versailles.

Is it not clear by this time that as long as the League of Nations remains a political organization, intrusted with carrying out the terms of the treaties of the Paris peace settlement and interested in purely European questions, the United States is well out of it? No protagonist of the League has been able to show how our participation would change the complexion of a single one of the major European problems. On the other hand, we have excellent reasons for believing that had we been represented on the Council of the League, the American delegates could not have helped taking sides in questions that would have hopelessly involved us in the morass of European intrigues, counter-ambitions, and cross-purposes. Four years ago we sensed the inconveniences and dangers of membership in the Versailles League; now we know them.

Aside from the futility and complications that would have arisen from any effort of the United States to play an active rôle in settling the problems

of Europe since the war, we must face the fact that membership in such an organization as the League of Nations has proved to be would give us a new set of internal difficulties to add to those that already seem to be quite enough for any nation to shoulder. Is it not evident that there is a wide divergence of opinion in this country on the merits of almost all the major problems in relation to which our executive would have had to take a stand, had we been in the League of Nations? Our millions of fellow-citizens of German descent do not view the Ruhr question as other millions of French sympathizers and the American Legion view it. Our millions of Poles see only one side to the Vilna and Upper Silesia and Eastern Galicia issues. Our millions of Italians are Mussolini enthusiasts and look upon the bombardment and seizure of Corfu as a glorious feat of arms to vindicate the honor of the mother-country. The Jews have their own ideas about Poland and Rumania. It is not too much to say that the numbers of American citizens who originated in transferred territories in Europe are larger than the supposedly oppressed new minorities now crying out to high Heaven against the formerly down-trodden peoples whom we helped to emancipate. These issues are being dealt with by the victors in the World War, sometimes with and sometimes without the aid of the League of Nations, purely on

the basis of their own particular national interests. European problems naturally affect all European nations. We have no interests to be safeguarded to influence our decision, or to make it wise that we should make a decision, on any of these questions. This being the case, it does not take much imagination to see how we should have got into hot water at Washington as well as at Geneva had we attempted to help settle European moot questions.

We have troubles of our own. It would be foolish to run the risk of letting any purely European question, in which we have no interest as a nation, enter into the internal politics of the United States. With Europe a seething mass of hatreds and conflicts, and with our population pan-European in origin, the inevitable result of membership in the League of Nations would be new complications for whatever administration was in power at Washington. One can picture the cries of warning from local politicians, with opposing pleas coming from Bridgeport, Connecticut, and Lowell, Massachusetts, on the Corfu question; from St. Louis and Cleveland and Buffalo on the Upper Silesian question; and so on, *ad infinitum*, until the White House and the State Department were unnerved. Seeing the mischief, one would cry, with Molière, "Why did he go into the galley?" Yes, why?

The crux of the question of the United States and

the League of Nations is the advantage of such an association to ourselves. What do we get out of it? Do we miss anything by not being a member? After we have examined this phase, which is always the first phase of a question where group action is concerned, we may take up the subject of helping other nations. Not being a cynic, and having faith in the inherent idealism of the American people, the writer is glad to be able to believe that the United States might be induced to enter the League of Nations with no selfish thought of personal advantage. But first of all we should have to be assured that we could be of service to other nations; and then we should have to be convinced that the other great powers, imbued with the same generous conception of a world organization, were ready to renounce or pool personal interests for the common good of all nations.

The events of 1917 and 1918 prove that the American people were ready to do their bit in the cause of world civilization. But the events of 1919 and 1920 proved equally that we did not propose to play Don Quixote all over Europe—and be damned for it!

The Harding and Coolidge administrations have had a peculiarly delicate situation to face in dealing with European powers, former allies and former enemies alike. Insistent appeals have come from

the other side of the Atlantic to lend a helping hand, and these appeals have not left us unmoved. The American State Department has taken the initiative several times toward constructive collaboration in solving major problems that have hindered the economic and political reconstruction of Europe. These moves have been publicly defined and discussed by Secretary Hughes, who has not once turned a deaf ear to overtures from European powers, and who has not hesitated himself to make suggestions wholly in keeping with the spirit of our peace program as outlined in detail by Woodrow Wilson.

It is clear that the failure of the United States to participate in European conferences is not due to our inability to see the needs of Europe or our unwillingness to collaborate in establishing peace. The fault lies in the fact that what we have been asked to do is to take sides, not to coöperate in an international organization. And by taking sides I do not mean helping our former allies against our former enemies. The former allies have been constantly at loggerheads. What has been proposed to us would amount to backing Great Britain against France or France against Great Britain. This is an unwelcome and unpalatable fact, but it is none the less a fact.

We do want to help Europe as a whole to recover

its equilibrium, for our own sake as much as for Europe's sake. But we cannot afford to champion one power against another. The result would be disastrous to ourselves as well as to Europe. With the general lines of the Levermore plan thoughtful Americans are in accord. But must not the European nations make possible our collaboration by recognizing and declaring to us that they have a community of interests transcending the particular interests of any one power? And when they have done this must they not seek our help on the basis of that declaration?

CHAPTER XIV

THE NECESSITY OF A NEW IMMIGRATION POLICY

TO say that America's place in the world depends upon the character of the population is repeating a commonplace, and yet this great truth needs to be reiterated. A large number of Americans concerned with the problem of how we are to take our rightful place in international councils do not seem to realize that we have not yet solved the immigration problem and that fixing the character of our population is of more vital and immediate importance than participation in a league of nations or a world court. A definite policy toward immigration must be adopted before we offer the aid of the United States to other nations in making more stable the bases of our common civilization and in establishing world peace.

Men under the spell of an idea, eager to see it launched, are impatient and resentful when their attention is called to unfinished business. But solving the immigration problem not only transcends entering upon a policy of coöperation with other

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nations; it precedes it. Let common sense speak! Ought we not to know what the character of the citizenship of the United States during the generation ahead of us is going to be before we commit ourselves to any scheme, however laudable, of American participation in European and world affairs? Can we safely launch our ship of state upon the uncharted seas of international politics without being sure of the composition of the crew that is going to man it?

These questions annoy enthusiasts. Those who put them are charged with seeking to create a diversion, to place fictitious lions in the path of "our clear duty," and to magnify out of all proportion the importance of a subject to which attention has not been paid simply because it is an unwelcome subject.

But our population is growing apace. Census authorities at Washington state that we have one hundred and fourteen millions in 1924, and that even with the most rigorous restriction of European immigration and the exclusion of Asiatic immigration we can certainly count upon one hundred and twenty millions in 1930. Relatively speaking, the native negro population is decreasing; many of our few hundred thousand Asiatics are leaving; and competent investigators are agreed that Europe is waiting for a repeal or modification of the existing

excellent temporary laws in order to make us a present of millions of undesirables to whom one-way passports will be issued. While the doors are closed, or at least partly shut, the time has come for stock-taking. And this stock-taking must not be done by a few officials, politicians, sociologists, and publicists. The inventory must be studied by all thoughtful and patriotic Americans. Then, with the inventory before us, we shall be able to pass upon the merits of the opposing theses of advocates of unrestricted or loosely restricted immigration and the advocates of making permanent and modifying still more constructively the temporary barriers to immigration erected by Congress since the World War.

One could fill a volume with alarming and thought-provoking statistics. Out of the mass of figures and percentages we have selected what seems to us enough to present the situation in its appalling reality.

Thirty-four million immigrants entered the United States between 1820 and 1920. Starting with the decade from 1820 to 1830, the number of immigrants increased per decade from less than 1 per cent of the total increase in population for the first decade to more than 50 per cent in the decade ending in 1910. Even with an almost complete stoppage during the World War, the last decade

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showed that immigration was responsible for 40 per cent of the increase from 1910 to 1920. In 1905 the annual total exceeded 1,000,000. In 1914, the year the World War began, 1,218,480 aliens passed into American ports.

Up to 1882 the majority of immigrants came from northern European countries, Great Britain and Ireland, Germany, and Scandinavia. From 1882 to 1914 three fifths of the 20,000,000 immigrants hailed from southern Italy, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Russia. Immediately after the World War the percentage in favor of these countries took a radical upward leap. Congress adopted temporary restrictive measures, limiting the entry of immigrants from each nation annually to 3 per cent of the number of settlers of the same nationality already resident here according to the census of 1910.

An analysis from official statistics of the 12,000,000 immigrants of newer stock admitted between 1882 and 1914 has shown that virtually all of them concentrated in the larger cities of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. Very few of them went to farms. They furnished most of the unskilled labor and the tenement population in these States. They have contributed alarmingly more than their per-

centage ratio to prisons, institutions for insane and defectives, and almshouses.

Statistics for New York City and Buffalo indicate that more than half the population is of foreign birth and more than 30 per cent admit speaking foreign languages in their homes. Of the foreign-born population scarcely half is of British, Celtic, and Germanic origin. New York City contains more than half the Jewish population of the United States. Buffalo has more Poles than British and Germans. Those actually born abroad in the two cities constitute more than one fourth of the population. Dr. Copeland states that in New York City the birth-rate for foreign-born women is 38 per thousand; of native-born, 16; of the typically American quarters, 7; and the infant mortality among children born of Americans is slightly higher than that of alien children. The Buffalo Chamber of Commerce has discovered that while nearly 80 per cent of the Germans and 65 per cent of the British are naturalized, only 45 per cent of the Italians, 35 per cent of the Poles, and 20 per cent of the Greeks have become citizens of the United States. Of the total white population of foreign birth of voting age in Buffalo to-day a bare half has been naturalized.

There is little doubt that Pittsburg, Cleveland,

Detroit, and Chicago contain equally large numbers of unassimilated aliens; and that smaller cities, especially in New England, face even more alarming conditions. The Chicago Association of Commerce declares that Chicago is only 28 per cent American in the strictest sense of the word, and that the proportion falls below 25 per cent if we consider apart the negroes. The old American stock in Chicago is hardly more than reproducing itself, and as Americans become educated and prosperous they tend to remain unmarried or have only one or two children to a family.

Powerful influences have been brought to bear at Washington to secure the repeal or softening of existing restriction laws and to combat legislative activity to limit still further European immigration or to restore its old character. These influences have been variously described and analyzed. And their nature and strength have been wrongly estimated. We can afford to dismiss the charges that two hierarchies, big business and the Catholic Church, have united to prevent the passage of immigration laws tending to solve the immigration problem in a patriotic American spirit. It is natural that church strategists and large employers of labor should hesitate before indorsing legislative measures of a rigorously restrictive nature that might hurt their interests. A certain amount of

lobbying has been done with the idea of a defeating legislation that might interfere with the growth of the Catholic Church and the free influx of labor upon which industrialists believe they depend for their prosperity. On the other hand, stronger groups than those opposing restriction exist both among ecclesiastics and industrialists which discount the inconveniences of restrictive laws and are more concerned with the problem of the character of the population of their country as Americans than as champions of particular interests. From my own observations I know that there is no concerted opposition to restricted immigration or to the passage of more rigorous laws on the part of either the Catholic hierarchy or the chambers of commerce of our large industrial centers. Exceptions in both cases prove the rule.

It can be said that the American nation as a whole, irrespective of religious or financial considerations, is willing to consider the immigration question on its merits. The kind of immigration that would be hit hardest by taking the census of 1890 or 1880 as a basis for annual ratios makes neither good churchmen nor good workers.

The serious enemies of "America for the Americans" are (1) the governments of the European countries that are discriminated against in the new immigration bill, and (2) the men in this coun-

try whose strength and power are due to the millions of aliens already here and who have counted upon a rapid increase of their influence through post-bellum immigration.

As an instance of the first category, we have the Mussolini Cabinet sending an impassioned protest to the State Department against the Johnson Bill. Italy is one of the Entente Powers; she has always been our friend; and her pride will not tolerate discrimination against her citizens, especially since she holds the discrimination to be unjust and inspired by unwarranted assumptions and not by facts.

A delicate question is raised. It is difficult not to sympathize with the Italian expression of hurt feelings, all the more so since we realize that Italy is becoming overpopulated and has no colonies in the temperate zone to which to send her surplus of human beings. But could we admit the validity of Italy's protest without finding ourselves in an untenable position in regard to Japan? Japan was one of the major powers associated with us in the recent war. Japan has a more serious problem of population bearing down on food supply than has Italy, and Japan is in a position similar to that of Italy in the matter of lack of colonizing areas. We have been far more rigorous in dealing with Japanese immigration than we purpose to

be in dealing with Italian immigration. But we have assured Japan, who is our friend as well as is Italy, that restriction or exclusion of immigration is not a proclamation of superiority and that it is not an act that violates in any way a fundamental principle of the comity of nations. We exclude Japanese for economic and sociological reasons, and in doing so we assert a right that every nation recognizes to other nations.

We have no choice but to respond to Italy and to other European countries that make protests, alleging discrimination against their nationals, that to acknowledge the validity of a protest would in itself be discrimination on our part. We must assert the right to determine as we think best the conditions of entry of immigrants into the United States. We have to consider our own well-being, of which we are the sole judges, and not the pride and economic necessities of other peoples. At the same time we can make clear to European countries, as we have tried to do to Japan, that by reverting to the census of 1890 for fixing ratios we are not proclaiming the superiority of the so-called Nordic stock. It is only that this stock is the original stock, and experience has taught us that it is assimilated far more easily than Mediterranean and Eastern European peoples.

The more difficult enemies of restricted immigra-

tion are those of the second category. It is to be feared that we are less sympathetic with them, however, because their arguments reveal a totally different conception from ours of what constitutes American nationhood. Everybody knows that a common language and a common culture are the forces that give birth to and nourish a nation and make it strong. And yet these enemies of restricted immigration are the very men who support foreign-language newspapers in our big cities, who do everything in their power to emphasize the separateness of their particular racial groups, who foster the establishment on American soil of organizations to keep alive Old-World traditions and loyalties. If American traditions and loyalties conflict with theirs, we are the ones who must change! In one breath they call America the melting-pot, and in the next they urge the members of their racial group to resist Americanization by maintaining a cultural allegiance to a foreign state, with ideals and institutions totally different from those of this country.

The idea is simply to use the United States as a convenient base of operations for other purposes than building up this country. The Italian banker encourages immigrants to save their money and to send it back for investment to the country from which they came, with the purpose in mind of going

back home when a stake is made. His example has been followed by Greek, Balkan, Polish, Hungarian, and Russian agents. Jews from these countries do not want to return—they would not be allowed to if they did—but they are worked upon to keep their language and culture and to give their money for the foundation and maintenance of a home-land in Palestine.

One does not criticize any of these elements, the Zionist Jews least of all, for looking back, for hoping to return, for having their eyes fixed on a far country. It is not criticism, and it is not lack of sympathy, however, to assert that the fewer immigrants we have of this type the better it will be for the United States. Our interest is not in any Old-World country or in Jerusalem, and we cannot conceive of a good American citizen with a divided allegiance, cultural or political. No man can serve two masters. It is preposterous—that is the only word that describes it—for leaders of alien groups in the United States, who intend that those groups shall remain alien, to cry from the housetops that restriction of immigration is un-American.

Propagandists for keeping the United States a dumping-ground for undesirables lament the decay of the true American spirit. We have succumbed to religious prejudice and racial discrimination, they say. Was not the United States

founded as a haven of refuge for the oppressed of Europe? Are we not forgetting our history and denying the generous ideals of our ancestors in shutting the door upon all who would come here to find a new life in a new world? This cry has touched the hearts of sentimentalists. Alas! there are many who think that just as America's place in the world is to bear the burdens of the world, without question of any return for the labor and risk involved, it is also America's place in the world to hold her arms wide open to receive whoever comes and as many as come. These are they who have no conception of a nation as a family, founded and conducted primarily for the purpose of the well-being of those who constitute it. A family would soon be wrecked and find itself in a position of inability to do for its own members if it assumed unlimited responsibilities for others and if it received in the bosom of the family an unlimited number of outsiders simply because the outsiders ought to have better family care than they were getting. A nation would be similarly wrecked.

In every chapter of this volume we have argued that the various problems of American foreign policy should be tested primarily by asking: how would this or that proposal affect our own security and prosperity? We must be true to ourselves; only then are we in a position to be true to others.

We cannot, therefore, take the needs or benefits of any group of immigrants as a starting-point of an immigration policy. For thirty years we refused to think about the effect of the annual influx of hundreds of thousands of Europeans into the United States. If the World War accomplished no other object than making us wake up to this problem it was worth all the suffering and sacrifices that our participation entailed upon us.

Those who thunder that we are shamefully unconscious of our international obligations and responsibilities and opportunities are right—but not for the reason that they give! The biggest international problem confronting the United States, the problem that menaces our security and prosperity, the problem that threatens to undermine the bases of our civilization is not the condition of war-ridden Europe but the condition of unassimilated Europeans in our own country. Our Irish politicians are in Boston; our oppressed Jews are in New York; our quarreling Poles are in Buffalo; our unpatriotic Germans are in Milwaukee; our churlish Hungarians are in the Pennsylvania coal-fields; our fifty-seven varieties of Slavs with Bolshevik tendencies, of Greeks not knowing what government they want, and of black-shirted Italians, are all over the United States. We have a population far greater than the Ruhr, hungry every day

through its own fault and not knowing it or acknowledging it, which detests us and our social order as much as the Germans detest the French. The Soviet authorities in Moscow have as little power to shock us as electricity would have if carried from Russia to America; but there are plenty of Russians in the United States, ignorant of our language and customs, who assume in their slum surroundings that all government is autocratic and who think that President Coolidge is another czar and should be treated accordingly.

We shall restrict still further the conditions governing immigration to the United States. We may find that we have to stop immigration altogether. But for our generation the problem remains of dealing wisely and constructively with millions of Europeans who are already or who will soon become our fellow-citizens. Even if we have little or no immigration, the law of arithmetical progression will be at work. Figure it out for yourself. Unless we change our conception of what the size of an American family should be, the grandchildren of aliens will outnumber us in our own country; perhaps even their children will do this.

Do we need to go to Geneva to find any national problem to solve? As alien stock, representing all Europe, increases in this country, does not the

United States bid fair to become a new Europe with transplanted barriers of different customs, different languages, different moral ideas, different political conceptions, and inherited antagonisms?

The answer depends upon ourselves. If we do not hastily rush into international commitments that will betray us into taking sides in European disputes, thus accentuating the already existing divisions among the unassimilated elements of our own population, we shall have a chance of pulling ourselves out of the hole we are in. But it is going to take all our capacity for understanding and self-sacrifice to deal with this international problem that is peculiarly our own.

To accomplish our purpose we must have a nation free from international entanglements, a nation speaking one language, a nation owning one allegiance, a nation understanding and doing honor to its Anglo-Saxon heritage of polity and jurisprudence, and a nation whose children are preponderantly of the blood of their fathers!

How is this to be brought about?

First of all we must not tolerate any other than a purely American foreign policy in our international relations. No element of our citizenship must be given reason to believe that the Government is intervening or coöperating with other governments for any object than the advancement of

American interests or the common interests of mankind to which the other governments are equally and unreservedly committed. This, of course, precludes our entering the League of Nations until it is a league of all nations devoted solely to advancing common world interests; and it precludes any effort on our part to assume the "moral leadership of the world" unless all nations are willing to follow. They and we need to be assured that American leadership does not mean pulling chestnuts out of the fire for certain nations to the detriment of others.

Then follows the establishment of an efficient and intelligent school system for adults and children, having as its goal the disappearance of illiteracy, the universality of the English language, and a real knowledge and appreciation of our institutions on the part of every inhabitant of the United States. Education does not have to be a state monopoly. There is much to be said against abolition of private or church schools, and in some cases children can be trained best in their own families by tutors or parents. We must consider avoiding the danger of destroying individuality and depriving those who want it of daily religious instruction. But the state should supervise all schools as to their curriculum; the state should provide adequate school facilities; and the state should not allow any pupils to be

taught by inexperienced, untrained, or temporary teachers. If these conditions are fulfilled, we need not despair of making good Americans out of all the immigrants who are already here.

The corollary of teaching is furnishing an example. How can we expect aliens—or even our own children, for that matter—to become good citizens if we are not good citizens ourselves? Despite the best of teaching the younger generation and adult aliens are not going to respect the law unless we respect it; they are not going to appreciate Anglo-Saxon polity unless we appreciate it; they are not going to have confidence in Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence unless we give them reason for that confidence. We of the older stock, therefore, will not have done our full duty to our country by breeding children and by giving our own children and those of others the opportunity for an education. We must do our part in insuring the immortality of the traditional spirit of American civilization. We must bother to exercise the right of suffrage, to take a vital interest in politics, to do jury service, to hold public office.

And all the while let us not forget that from within and without the pressure upon the immigration dike is tremendous. If we believe that the erection and maintenance of the dike is our salvation, no pressure will be strong enough to break it down.

CHAPTER XV

PITFALLS THAT MUST BE AVOIDED IN ENTERING WORLD POLITICS

I AM painfully aware of having omitted important phases of the subjects in every chapter of this book, and there is a sense of having failed to discuss adequately any one of the problems. The field is vast, and the American people have hardly even begun to think internationally. Until there is some definite reaction of public opinion, based upon mature thought and not upon hysteria or sentimentality, spade work is all that we can do in this field. The scope of these pages has been strictly limited to breaking ground for a sane approach to the proposition that the United States participate, in the way in which other nations are participating and under the same charter, in international affairs.

If I have insisted upon security and prosperity as the cardinal aims of foreign policy, if I have called attention to the motives that have guided us and other nations in our international relations up to the present time, if I have insisted that the world-

wide status quo has been created by force and can be maintained only by force, it is not because I am temperamentally a cynic and a realist. The ancients depicted Minerva as springing full-grown from the head of Jupiter. Many Americans seem to think that the United States can be born into an adult's place in European politics with the same ease. It may be possible for wisdom to dispense with the stages of infancy and childhood, but a nation, especially a nation of our background and character, has to have its eye-teeth not only cut but sharpened before it takes its seat in the European international council-chambers.

We have never played the game of world politics; we do not know how to play it; all the others are playing it for definite stakes, and we have not yet made up our minds whether we want to play for money or not; and even if we knew the rules of the game, we should still be handicapped from the fact that our governmental system renders it impossible for us to be represented in the game in the way in which European countries are represented.

On the League of Nations Council, for instance, the delegates are either members of the cabinet of the country they represent or are responsible to the cabinet; the cabinet, in turn, including its premier, is composed solely of elected representatives of the

people, is responsible to the parliament, and can be dismissed at any moment. And then, if the parliament seems to have lost the confidence of the country, an election can be held to determine what is the will of the country. This makes it possible for delegates of European nations to speak for their respective countries without hesitation in the discussions at Geneva, and to bind the countries they represent. Points to be cleared up can be discussed over the telephone, or couriers take only a day to go and a day to return from any European capital. The delegates themselves can return home for conferences. If an important matter comes up, the premier or minister of foreign affairs can go to Geneva as delegate. There is this same facility for European nations in any international conference in Europe—the same facility and the same feeling of authority and responsibility.

How radically different is our system! Both the executive and legislative branches of our government are chosen for definite terms. The executive is distinct from the legislative. The American President chooses his own cabinet at his discretion. The members do not have to be members of Congress. Our secretary of state is not required to go before Congress to defend the policies of his department. Congress in no way controls the activities of the State Department; but, on the other

hand, the State Department has no power to make an international agreement or treaty but merely to submit proposed agreements and treaties to the Senate, which decides whether they are acceptable or not. It is a rigid system, and we must face this fact, that it does not lend itself to international coöperation. It is impossible, unless the system be changed, for the United States to participate with European nations effectively on the Council of the League of Nations or in international organizations formed for continuity of operation.

Over and over again I have pointed out to the most eminent advocates of our entry into the League of Nations this very serious handicap, and I have asked them how they would overcome it. I have protested against the statement so frequently made that if nations like Great Britain and France, who are so jealous of their sovereignty, find no difficulty in participating in the League, there is no drawback to the participation of the United States. Articles X and XVI do not worry nations so near the seat of the League, who are represented by men with the kind of authority that our delegates could not possess. The League of Nations partizans in the United States have never frankly met this objection. Their answer is always the old *argumentum ad hominem*, that for men of good will a way out can be found (they do not explain

the way), and that opponents of our rushing blindly into European politics raise this point from pure human cussedness to block the path to world peace!

But the sensible man, building for the future, when he is invited to follow a certain path, looks for pitfalls before embarking upon an adventure. This does not mean that he dislikes the invitation or that he is deliberately looking for excuses. He is unwilling to start on the journey without reasonable assurance that he can move forward toward the goal.

Partizans and enthusiasts and sentimentalists grow impatient when we talk of pitfalls. They brush them aside as of no consequence. When we insist, impatience turns to anger. But we must not be deterred from being sensible in our consideration of the proposition even if they are not. The glorious vision of the goal so dazzles them that they think—or rather they jump at the conclusion—that the man who wants to test the path is afraid or does not want to follow it. During five years earnest students of international affairs have been confronted with this curious mentality, and in it they have recognized the reason why the American people as a whole have instinctively held back from trusting unskilled pilots on uncharted seas.

One is almost tempted to quote the old saw that ends, "where angels fear to tread." But this would

be unwarranted. The sincerity and ability (in other fields than politics) of pro-League enthusiasts are unquestioned. Their impatience weakens their judgment and makes them uncharitable; the impatience of others is no warrant for the objective student of world politics to become impatient in turn. Arousing feeling, calling names, damning the other fellow, do no earthly good. St. Paul said that one must be all things to all men in order to win some.

We subscribe to the statement that the United States should and must participate in world affairs; many of us, however, are not sure that the League of Nations is either the best way or the only way in which we can help the world. By examining the pitfalls we are not throwing cold water upon the plea for international coöperation. Common sense suggests that we test the path we purpose to follow, that we know where and how we are going before we commit ourselves.

Illustrations of the wisdom of looking for pitfalls are not wanting. Recent history ought to have taught us that Europe is not waiting to do our bidding, that Europe has not told us all that is on her mind, and even that Europe is not so eager for American collaboration in settling post-bellum political problems as we have been led to think. Ray Stannard Baker's volumes on "Woodrow Wil-

son and World Settlement" furnish irrefutable evidence from Mr. Wilson's own speeches and papers that he led us into the World War and later went to the Peace Conference without being aware of the existence of secret treaties that would make impossible a peace based upon the fourteen points. Mr. Baker's work, too, written in full sympathy with our former President, reveals the utter failure of the European nations to be influenced by the moral considerations advanced by Mr. Wilson during the Peace Conference. Our advice was not listened to; our help was wanted only when it was a question of advancing the particular interests of the several major victorious powers; and objective and constructive suggestions on the part of Mr. Wilson that put the common weal above particular interests were invariably bitterly resented.

Our influence was slight during the Peace Conference; it has been nil ever since. And because we have the facts of the Peace Conference before us, we refuse to admit the validity of the argument that if we had been a member of the Council of the League of Nations most of the present woes of Europe would have been avoided. The American people have not said much, for their hearts are still with France; but their heads told them long ago that the proposition of Secretary Hughes concerning

the Ruhr and reparations, as revealed in Mr. Hughes' speech at New Haven in December, 1922, was practical common sense. Was it accepted by France? No. The only response was an exceedingly bitter attack upon our Government for being "pro-German" and failing to sympathize with the just grievances of France.

The first pitfall is overestimating our moral influence. We have done this consistently; many are doing it still. If we persist in it we shall make no progress along the path of peace. Others do not think of us as we think of ourselves. Outside of the United States you will find none who thinks that we participated in the World War for any other reason than to save our investments abroad and to use the Entente Powers to fight for us against the Germany that we were beginning to fear. I am constantly discovering that American audiences and readers are hurt and indignant when one tells them that the United States has not a chance in the world of getting any other nation to acknowledge our moral superiority and our disinterestedness. Unfortunately we ourselves have erroneous notions of the idealistic past history of our country in her international relations. When Emerson said, "What you are shouts so I cannot hear what you say," he might have been speaking of our own

or other nations in the eyes of the rest of the world. Smugness tends to blindness of one's faults—but blindness only on the part of oneself!

Two cross-eyed men once bumped into each other. "I wish you would look where you are going," complained one. "I wish you would go where you are looking," retorted the other. Is there not food for thought in this story?

The second pitfall is overestimating our disinterestedness. This was one of the great defects of the Versailles Treaty. Contracts without a *quid pro quo* are worthless. The party whose interests are overlooked, even though he agreed to waive any advantage when the contract was made, is not likely to live up to it. There is no incentive to do so. When we proffer our aid to all the world and his brother, without any return, as we have been urged to do on every occasion for the last ten years, and when we do actually go in to help from sheer altruism, we are not really honest with ourselves—and we do not stick at it. We regret the obligations we unthinkingly assumed, and we wriggle out of them. Nations and individuals are alike in this. It is not human nature to make a practice of giving with one hand unless you are at the same time taking with the other. Perhaps that is the reason why you should not let your right hand know what your left hand is doing.

There is another deterrent to assuming a disinterested attitude. Others refuse to believe that you are disinterested. If you insist that you are, they grow suspicious. I have traveled far and wide in Europe since the World War. I have found none to agree with me that even our child-feeding was disinterested. It is an axiom in Europe that the dollar-chasing Yankees are incapable of disinterestedness. The nigger is searched for in every wood-pile, despite our magnificent gestures. For instance, just as we are believed to have come into the war to save ourselves from having to fight Germany alone after she had won, if we cancel any portion of the indebtedness of European governments to us it will be regarded as a confession on our part either that the money is not owed or that we cross it off because we know that we cannot collect it. We can depend upon it that because of our wealth and power, so largely and pitifully accidental, there is so much jealousy and resentment against us that whatever we do in Europe we shall be misunderstood. Interested motives will be imputed to us, and the more we deny them, the more Europeans will think that we do protest too much.

We must not allow the existence of these two pitfalls to discourage us. Let us anticipate them, and let us do what is necessary in order to avoid them. Pride and sentimentality will suffer a bit, to be sure,

but in every human association we go through the same experience, even with those nearest and dearest to us. Why do we not recognize the fact that we really are very much "as ithers see us"? The pretense of moral superiority is distasteful; the assumption of the attitude of the benefactor is hateful. Why not rid ourselves of both? In going into international politics, then, we ought to admit that we are not much better, if any better, than the nations we work with, and it is still more important that we abandon the fiction of Uncle Sam as a benefactor, helping everybody for the sheer love of it.

We have inherited from an Anglo-Saxon and Protestant civilization precious institutions and traditions, which are as dear to us as life itself. But along with these blessings we have the fault of cant. We fool ourselves by concealing our motives, by a moral quirk of Pharisaism. Because of cant we are going to find it difficult to avoid the pitfalls that we must avoid if we are going to coöperate usefully and constructively with other nations for the common good. In preparation for participation in world affairs, Rabindranath Tagore is an inspiring helper. He tells us:

Preaching your doctrine is no sacrifice at all. It is indulging in a luxury far more dangerous than all the luxuries

of material living. It breeds an illusion in your mind that you are doing your duty—that you are wiser and better than all your fellow-beings. If you have pride of race and pride of personal superiority, then it is no use to try to do good to others. They will reject your gift, or even if they do accept it, they will not be morally benefited by it. It is utterly degrading to accept any benefit except that which is offered in the spirit of love. When man tries to usurp God's place and to assume the rôle of a giver of gifts, then it is all vanity.

In our foreign policy we have to show a frank and healthy spirit of wanting something substantial for our money. In the Council of the League as well as in any international conference we must be prepared to answer the question, "What do you want for yourselves?" If we say, "Nothing," the others will not understand, because that is not their language; they will begin to suspect that we are cherishing some sinister project. It will be no use for us to say that we are not thinking of a *quid pro quo*. The head of the house of Osman never sets his foot on soil that does not instantly belong to him. Of course he can give it back. When Abdul Medjid visited Napoleon III, who came to greet him at Marseilles, an attendant had ready a box containing the earth of France. The sultan's first act was to hand the box to the emperor with the words, "I give it to you." The emperor was

unaware of the ceremony. What the interpreter told him was something different.

The third pitfall is failure to learn the game before trying to play it. World politics is a game which, like all other games, is a development, its present rules being based on past experience, and which cannot be played well without practice. Possessing information and statistics and being logical did not help us to play the game in Paris.

One does not know whether to laugh or cry when one reads the literature of American propaganda organizations, whose purpose is to establish universal peace, reform the League of Nations, make the World Court a decisive factor in preventing wars, reestablish a spirit of love in Europe by feeding the starving, stabilize European currencies—all this by official action of the American Government. There is a town near my home which has an electric sign on the bridge over the Delaware: "Trenton makes; the world takes." The slogan of these propagandists ought to be (and it would be equally true): "America says; the world obeys."

I am reminded of an efficient American sent by the Y.M.C.A. to make a social survey in approved American form of the great Arab city of Aleppo. Requests for data under many heads were submitted day after day to an old sage, who kept quiet at

first, but who finally burst into an all-inclusive answer: "O son of the West, why ask such foolish questions? Who knows how many camels come in and go out of the gates of Aleppo? And as for water-supply, who in Aleppo ever yet died of thirst? And of births, who can regulate them? And of deaths, only Allah and his angels can tell!"

To avoid the third pitfall, we should study the foreign relations of other nations, not to get a mass of facts as to what they have done, but to seek to understand why they have done it. Problems must be discussed from an objective point of view. The fact that we like the French, for instance, does not make the Ruhr policy either wise or successful, any more than our love for our sons makes certain their success in their college examinations. As long as we remain subjective, swayed by sentiment and preference, in our judgments of foreign policies, we are novices at playing the game, and we ought to keep out of it. I know a man who is a wonder at poker, cool and calculating and ready to take the last dollar from his best friend. He knows that game. But the same man is a sentimentalist and a prejudiced assumer of the truth of things he has never investigated when he comes to world politics. If he approached the game of poker as he approaches

the game of world politics, he would have been bankrupt long ago, or he would have had to quit the game.

This leads us to the fourth pitfall. When we enter world politics, we must make up our minds not to take sides. The idea that we must be for or against this or that foreign nation seems to be inherent in the American's mental attitude. If it were not for the fact that George Washington saw what a danger this was, and expressed his mind upon it several times but nowhere more clearly than in his farewell address, I should be inclined to believe that sports had something to do with it. In professional baseball as well as amateur football, in school sports from our early childhood up, we are taught that school spirit or town spirit demands not only rooting for but believing in the success of one's own team. The basis of reckoning the team's chances of success is not coldly comparing its record with that of its opponent. Not at all. Because you belong to Princeton, Princeton is going to win, and you back your belief with your money.

Is it this training that has given rise to a black and white idea of morality? We remember *Mawruss* in "Potash and Perlmutter." He had not been an American citizen long, and it is probable that he spoke to *Abe* in Yiddish. But he kept saying, "Am I right or wrong?" He wanted a

yes or a no, and if the answer was no, he was ready for a fight. Many Americans do not even ask the question. It is always comfortable to assume that you yourself are right, and, by extension, that your friends, or those you have been rooting for or supporting, are right. They can't be sometimes right and sometimes wrong. They must be always, invariably, everlastingly right.

This is the most important pitfall of all to avoid; for if we should go lightly along the path to collaboration with other nations, and fall into this pitfall, other nations, seeing our weakness, will seek to use us for their own purposes. This has already been tried.

More serious still is the fact we have already emphasized in an earlier chapter that, by reason of the composite population of the United States, we cannot champion the interests of any one European nation or group of nations against another or others. It is idle for Anglophiles and Francophiles to insist, as they have been doing for so many years, that patriotism and love of our own country are synonymous with blind support of France and Great Britain. Like most Americans I abhorred and fought against Germany in the World War, and have had very little patience with Germany since. But fair-mindedness compels me to admit that there was no reason why Americans of German origin

should not have sympathized with Germany before the United States entered the war, and why they should not again sympathize with the Fatherland at the present time. They have just as much reason to do so as an American of British descent has to sympathize with Great Britain and work for closer ties of friendship between this country and his country of origin.

If we rush into international affairs without having made up our minds not to take sides, all our efforts to work constructively for world peace will fail. More than that, we cannot even have internal peace. There will be much fishing in troubled waters at Washington. The hyphen in American citizenship is equally obnoxious whatever foreign power it binds us to. On the other hand, a feeling of affection for a European country, even of partizanship for that country when the enemy is not the country of adoption, is admissible for the German-American as much as for the British-American. A German-American who, after having sworn allegiance to the United States, continues to love best his own land is contemptible. But even more contemptible is the German-American who would look with equanimity upon his country of adoption backing any European nation in time of peace against his country of origin.

But another danger, which is as amusing as it is

embarrassing, arises from taking sides too violently and attempting to keep up as a nation inordinate affections after the reason for them has passed. During the World War we were backing a group of nations and would hear no criticism of the character or motives of the foreign policy of any of them. We assumed, without warrant for the assumption in history or human nature, that the Entente Powers were going to stick together after the World War. They have not done so. They are drifting apart. To-day they are antagonistic. The allies of yesterday may very easily become the enemies of to-morrow. In case of a war between France and Great Britain, for instance, where would we stand? Whatever we did, the attitude of those who believe that France and Great Britain together were right in all they did would have to be modified. The sense of disillusionment would remain. It is possible that contacts would have been formed positively harmful to the American citizen in performing his duty whole-heartedly to his own country.

Already, since the World War, we have had a case of comrades in arm turning against an ally to help a former enemy. France and Italy owed much to Greece, whose help had been precious in the dark days of 1917 and 1918. This did not prevent the two powers from aiding Turkey, who had fought against them for four years, to crush Greece.

The lack of moral sense in nations in their international relations, their unscrupulousness, the absence of loyalty and a sense of obligation, make alliances among nations ephemeral. Alliances are formed only for the advancement of mutual interests. When either partner feels that the alliance does not pay, it is abandoned overnight. Sadly enough there seems to be no exception to this rule.

By taking sides we also lessen our ability to stand up for ourselves, our own interests, our own ideals. Numerous instances since the World War can be cited to prove that the powers with whom we were associated in that war have tried to take advantage of our friendship to advance their own interests at the expense of our interests. A whole series of notes of the Wilson and Harding administrations proves this. The British worked against us, officially and unofficially, in Persia, Mesopotamia, Constantinople, and Egypt; the French have tried to discriminate against our commerce in Morocco; the French and the Italians have made no effort to pay interest upon or refund their debt; the French and the British have asserted the right to deny us equality of treatment in mandated territories; in the Belgian Senate we have been told by its presiding officer in a public speech that we owe the Entente Powers six times as much money as we claim they owe us; the French and the British

tried to evade the responsibility of sharing collections from Germany for the payment of our Army of Occupation; and Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan could not see that we should have any right or share whatever in the cables taken from Germany.

Our ideals have suffered, too. We have not stood up for them; we have even tacitly admitted that Mr. Wilson went too far; we have condoned many, many things that we denounced during the war. Do we not see that by taking sides interests and ideals are both inevitably compromised? Individually and nationally, we have been pro-everything else but pro-American. By becoming violent partizans of one or another European nation, we have illustrated perfectly the truth of George Washington's observation:

Nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that in place of them, just and amicable feeling toward all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave of its animosity or of its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.

This is the line of argument in the Farewell Address. Protagonists of the League of Nations de-

clare that Washington spoke for his own day and did not foresee the economic and political changes and the future greatness of his country when he advocated isolation. They say that if Washington lived to-day he would speak differently. This is nonsense. Washington's advice was based upon the weakness of human nature and the weakness of the thirteen colonies; the reason he gave for not rushing into the European maelstrom is as good to-day as when he uttered it.

Far from advocating membership in the League of Nations, I believe that the father of our country would give us a word of caution against internationalism were he with us to-day. In their implications, so far as whole-hearted devotion to the interest of one's own country goes, I have come to believe that there is little to choose between the peace agitators and the partizans of any European racial group. The types do not mix. But they have had in common furthering the interests of other countries or races without thinking of the interests of their own; and they have propagandized in favor of a panacea to the oblivion of the fact that their own country cannot afford to change from a wolf into a sheep unless a simultaneous change takes place in the others of the pack. Who would consent to divest himself of

his means of defense and yet remain with the wolves—in fact, aspire to lead them?

This last pitfall we can avoid by being good Americans, resolved to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for no nation, and by entering world affairs without pride or arrogance, but with our eyes open and with a frank desire to look after ourselves. We should tolerate no foreign policy, in detail or in general, that neglects to consider as a paramount obligation and object the security and the prosperity of the nation. “Be ye sober-minded,” admonished St. Paul. Heaven knows, we need that warning these days!

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